DOCUMENT RESUME

ED 182 818 EA 012 418

AUTHOR Hood, Paul D., Ed.
TITLE New Perspectives on Planning, Management, and Evaluation in School Improvement: A Report on the 1979 Far West Laboratory Summer Workshop on Educational Dissemination and School Improvement.
INSTITUTION Far West Lab. for Educational Research and Development, San Francisco, Calif.
SPONS AGENCY National Inst. of Education (DHEW), Washington, D.C.
PUB DATE Nov 79
GRANT OB-NIE-G-78-0203
NOTE 108p.

EDRS PRICE MF01/PC05 Plus Postage.
DESCRIPTORS Case Studies (Education); *Educational Improvement; Elementary Secondary Education; Literature Reviews; Management; *Models; *Organizational Development; *Organizational Theories; Planning; Program Evaluation; Speeches

ABSTRACT

This paper is the result of a 1979 workshop that examined potential applications of new perspectives on organizational planning, management, and evaluation as they apply to school improvement efforts. Section 1 reproduces an orientation paper mailed to conference participants. Section 2 contains an informal report of the proceedings reconstructed from notes made by four participants. Some of the procedures discussed include loosely coupled systems, organized anarchies, configurational perspectives, contingency frameworks, "garbage can" decision processes, goal-free planning, goal-free evaluation, and adaptive management of change and implementation processes. (Author/LD)

****
* Reproductions supplied by EDRS are the best that can be made *
* from the original document. *
****

ED182818

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION & WELFARE
NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF EDUCATION

THIS DOCUMENT HAS BEEN REPRODUCED EXACTLY AS RECEIVED FROM THE PERSON OR ORGANIZATION ORIGINATING IT. POINTS OF VIEW OR OPINIONS STATED DO NOT NECESSARILY REPRESENT OFFICIAL NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF EDUCATION POSITION OR POLICY

Educational Dissemination Systems Support Program

FAR WEST LABORATORY
FOR EDUCATIONAL RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
1855 FOLSOM STREET · SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA 94103

EA 012 418

NEW PERSPECTIVES ON PLANNING, MANAGEMENT, AND EVALUATION IN SCHOOL IMPROVEMENT: A REPORT ON THE 1979 FAR WEST LABORATORY SUMMER WORKSHOP ON EDUCATIONAL DISSEMINATION AND SCHOOL IMPROVEMENT

Edited by Paul D. Hood

November 1979

EDUCATIONAL DISSEMINATION SYSTEMS SUPPORT PROGRAM

FAR WEST LABORATORY FOR EDUCATIONAL RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT

This project has been supported with federal funds from the National Institute of Education, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, under Grant # OB-NIE-G-78-0203. The contents of this publication do not necessarily reflect the views or policies of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare and the National Institute of Education, nor does mention of trade names, commercial products, or organizations imply endorsement by the U.S. Government or the Far West Laboratory.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF FIGURES AND TABLES..... v

ABSTRACT..... vi

INTRODUCTION 1

SECTION 1: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON PLANNING, MANAGEMENT, AND EVALUATION IN SCHOOL IMPROVEMENT 5

A Call for New Perspectives..... 5

Organized Anarchies, Loose Coupling, and Garbage Cans..... 6

Configurational Perspectives, Goal-Free Methods, and Adaptive Procedures..... 11

Commentary..... 18

SECTION II: THE 1979 SUMMER WORKSHOP ON EDUCATIONAL DISSEMINATION AND SCHOOL IMPROVEMENT..... 20

Overview..... 20

Agenda..... 20

MONDAY, JULY 23rd SESSION..... 21

- A Call for New Perspectives, Paul Hood..... 21

- Overview of New Perspectives in Organizational Theory Karl Weick..... 22

- Reactions and Discussion of Weick Presentation..... 29

- A New Perspective on Implementation Design: Adaptive Implementing, Paul Berman..... 31

- Reactions and Discussion of Berman Presentation..... 34

- A New Perspective on National Planning for School Improvement Programs: The Configurational Perspective and Goal-Free Planning, David Clark..... 38

- Discussion and Commentary of Clark Presentation..... 45

FEB 13 1980

Table of Contents Continued

- Newer Perspectives in the Evaluation of School Improvement Programs: Goal-Free Evaluation; School Improvement Profile, Michael Scriven..... 48

- Questions and Comments on GFE..... 49

- Reactions and Discussion of Scriven Presentation..... 53

- General Discussion and Comment..... 56

TUESDAY, JULY 24TH SESSION: PANEL DISCUSSION OF PREVIOUS DAY'S PRESENTATIONS..... 57

- Consensus Across the Perspectives
Carolyn S. Cates..... 57

- Comments..... 57

- Issues and Problems Raised by the Presentations
Anne Huff..... 59

- Discussion..... 62

- Evaluation and Adaptive Implementation
Paul Berman..... 65

- Marginal Glosses
Karl Weick..... 68

WEDNESDAY, JULY 25th SESSION..... 72

- Two School Improvement Case Studies
Ann Lieberman..... 72

- Commentary..... 75

- Two Case Studies of Program Implementation in a State Education Agency
Sue McKibbin..... 77

- Comments..... 80

- Designing Next Steps..... 81

SECTION III: POSTSCRIPT..... 88

REFERENCES..... 94

BIBLIOGRAPHY..... 96

LIST OF FIGURES AND TABLES

Figure 1.1 THORNGATE'S IMPOSSIBILITY POSTULATE..... 22

Figure 1.2 THE GARBAGE CAN AND THE ORGANIZED ANARCHY..... 24

Figure 1.3 A LOOSE COUPLING METAPHOR..... 25

Figure 1.4 TWO TYPES OF ORGANIZATION TO ENVIRONMENT COUPLING..... 27

Figure 2.1 PROGRAMMED APPROACH..... 32

Figure 2.1 (Amended) PROGRAMMED APPROACH..... 66

Figure 2.2 ADAPTIVE APPROACH..... 33

Figure 2.2 (Amended) ADAPTIVE APPROACH..... 66

Figure 2.3 MATCHING IMPLEMENTATION APPROACHES TO POLICY SITUATIONS..... 34

Figure 2.4 THREE DIMENSIONS OF POLICY IMPLEMENTATION..... 35

Figure 2.5 TWO VIEWS OF IMPLEMENTATION..... 36

Figure 3.1 THE TRIANGLE HYPOTHESIS..... 69

Figure 3.2 RELATION OF IMPLEMENTATION APPROACHES TO DISCIPLINED INQUIRY..... 76

Table 1 CONTEXT OF NATIONAL PLANNING FOR SCHOOL IMPROVEMENT PROGRAMS..... 39

Table 2 GOAL-FREE PLANNING: AN ALTERNATIVE TO SYSTEMS-ORIENTED, GOAL-BASED PLANNING..... 44 & 45

ABSTRACT

The 1979 Far West Laboratory Summer Workshop examined the premises and potential applications of new perspectives on organizational planning, management, and evaluation such as: loosely coupled systems, organized anarchies, configurational perspectives, contingency frameworks, garbage can decision processes, goal-free planning, goal-free evaluation, and adaptive management of change and implementation processes. This report contains presentations made by Karl Weick, Paul Berman, David Clark, Michael Scriven, Carolyn Cates, Anne Huff, Ann Lieberman, and Sue McKibbin, together with commentary on the individual presentations and general discussion of the relevance of these perspectives for school improvement.

INTRODUCTION

Among other objectives, the FWL Educational Dissemination Systems Support Program (EDSSP) aims to increase the quality of and access to knowledge and technology pertaining to the educational dissemination and utilization process. As part of the FWL Social Change Department, it works closely with the FWL Regional Program to support school improvement and other educational change efforts in the Far West region and nationally. By maintaining a dual orientation focusing on both regional and national dissemination and school improvement activities, EDSSP builds a capability for developing local- and state-level school improvement capacity in the Far West region, and for accomplishing local/national mediation, especially with respect to providing conceptual frameworks, syntheses of knowledge, and access to information and resources on a national basis.

One of the key strategies in EDSSP efforts is to contribute to the development of applied conceptual frameworks for accomplishing analyses and syntheses based on available knowledge, and to develop strategies and methods that can be applied practically to improve R&D-based knowledge utilization by those directly concerned with improving instructional practice in elementary and secondary schools. However, much of the knowledge about educational dissemination, utilization, and school improvement processes tends to be highly dispersed, unorganized, and not easily accessible to those at national, regional, state, or local levels who might actually use it. Consequently, part of our effort is directed toward synthesizing and communicating knowledge about educational dissemination and school improvement processes. But there should also be a science and a technology. It is our belief that the most appropriate and powerful technology will deal

directly with the way people think about and approach practical dissemination and school improvement problems and opportunities. This is the rationale for our emphasis on applied conceptual frameworks.

Summer workshops are one of several methods employed by the program to develop and test these conceptual frameworks. During the 1978 summer workshop, workshop participants made several conference calls to David Clark at Indiana University regarding policy and planning implications of the Clark and Guba Configurational Perspective. Subsequent to the workshop, EDSSP staff discussed with Dr. Clark the possibility that he would help conduct the 1979 workshop. In subsequent planning, it was decided to invite several nationally prominent scholars as co-presenters and a small number of leading educators and researchers who were highly knowledgeable concerning school improvement programs to attend as reactors. Paul Berman, School of Public Policy, University of California, Berkeley; Michael Scriven, Director of the Evaluation Institute, University of San Francisco; and Karl Weick, Graduate School of Business and Public Administration, Cornell University; agreed to join David Clark and Paul Hood, Far West Laboratory, in this workshop venture.

The objectives of the workshop included:

- To become familiar with the premises and methods implied by new perspectives on organizational planning, management, and evaluation such as:
    - loosely coupled systems
    - organized anarchies
    - configurational perspectives
    - contingency frameworks
    - garbage can decision processes
    - goal-free planning
    - goal-free evaluation
    - adaptive management of change and implementation processes.

- To gain an understanding of and evaluate the potential of these perspectives for use in planning, management, and evaluation of multi-agency school improvement efforts.

- To explicitly identify, examine and evaluate alternative strategies for development and implementation of these concepts as means for achieving more effective inter-level (national, regional, state, local), inter-program, and inter-agency cooperation.

- To exchange information and develop a basis for future personal exchange among participants regarding their experiences in planning, management, or evaluation of cooperative school improvement efforts.

The workshop participants were:

Bela Banathy, Educational Systems Analysis Program, Far West Laboratory (FWL)

Paul Berman, School of Public Policy, University of California, Berkeley

Davis Campbell, California State Department of Education (July 2 Planning Session)

Carolyn Cates, Educational Dissemination Systems Support Program, FWL

David Clark, School of Education, Indiana University

Phil Daro, California State Department of Education

John Hemphill, Director, Far West Laboratory for Educational Research and Development

Paul Hood, Educational Dissemination Systems Support Program, FWL

Anne Huff, Institute for Social Science Research, University of California, Los Angeles

Lynn Jenks, Regional Service Program, FWL

Ann Lieberman, Teachers College, Columbia University

Ward Mason, Research and Educational Practice Program, National Institute of Education

Sue McKibbin, School of Education, University of Illinois

Barbara Monty, Continuing Education Technical Assistance Center, FWL

William Paisley, Institute for Communication Research, Stanford University

Stanley Schainker, Regional Service Program, FWL

Michael Scriven, Evaluation Institute, University of San Francisco

James Smith, California State Department of Education

Karl Weick, Graduate School of Business and Public Administration, Cornell University

Following this introductory section is an "orientation" paper that was mailed to participants before the conference. The intent of this paper was to provide a brief description of some of the key concepts and perspectives that would be discussed at the workshop. The second section contains an informal report of the proceedings of the July 23-25, 1979 workshop. It should be emphasized that this report is not a verbatim record of the presentations or of the discussions, rather it is a markedly abridged record that was reconstructed by Paul Hood from notes made by four participants. The final section provides a postscript prepared by David Clark.

SECTION I

NEW PERSPECTIVES ON PLANNING, MANAGEMENT, AND EVALUATION IN SCHOOL IMPROVEMENT: ORGANIZED ANARCHIES, LOOSELY COUPLED SYSTEMS, GARBAGE CAN MODELS, CONFIGURATIONAL PERSPECTIVES, GOAL-FREE METHODS, ADAPTIVE PROCESSES, AND THE TECHNOLOGY OF FOOLISHNESS

A Call for New Perspectives

A few years ago James March wrote an article on Model Bias in Social Action (1972). Toward the end of that article he made a case for a "technology of foolishness" to counter excessively rational views of social action. He noted, "If we had a good technology of foolishness, it might [in combination with the technology of reason] help in a small way to develop the unusual combination of attitudes and behaviors that describe interesting people, interesting organizations, and interesting societies of the world."

In a brief discussion of some general implications of his ideas he noted needs to: 1) reexamine the functions of management decision; 2) to develop a modified view of planning; 3) to reconsider evaluation; 4) to reconsider social accountability; and 5) to accept playfulness in social organizations. The Far West Laboratory 1979 Summer Workshop proposes to examine the first three of these needs as they apply specifically to elementary and secondary school improvement. Our intent is to consider the feasibility of developing a "technology of foolishness" that would be applicable to school improvement.

Regarding these three needs March commented:

> One of the primary ways in which the goals of an organization are developed is by interpreting the decisions it makes, and one feature of good managerial decisions is that they lead to the development of more interesting value premises for the organization. As a result, decisions should not be seen as

> flowing directly or strictly from a preexistent set of objectives. Managers who make decisions might well view that function somewhat less as a process of deduction or a process of political negotiation, and somewhat more as a process of gently upsetting preconceptions of what the organization is doing...
>
> Planning in organizations has many virtues, but a plan can often be more effective as an interpretation of past decisions than as a program for future ones... In an organization that wants to continue to develop new objectives, a manager needs to be relatively tolerant of the idea that he will discover the meaning of yesterday's action in the experiences and interpretations of today...
>
> As nearly as I can determine there is nothing in a formal theory of evaluation that requires the criterion function for evaluation be specified in advance. In particular, the evaluation of social experiments need not be in terms of the degree to which they have filled our a priori expectations. Rather we can examine what they did in terms of what we now believe to be important... Experience should be used explicitly as an occasion for evaluating our values as well as our actions.
> (March, 1972, pp. 427-428.)

In response to this call for reconsideration of management decisions, planning, and evaluation, March and his associates (Cohen, March, Olsen, 1972; March and Olsen, 1976), have developed new ways of looking at decision making and planning in organizations in terms of a "garbage can model" of organizational decision making. And Michael Scriven (1974, 1976) has developed Goal-Free Evaluation (GFE).

Organized Anarchies, Loose Coupling, and Garbage Cans

These ideas have been applied to educational settings at both local and national levels. Among the recent studies of innovation adoptions in school organizations Daft and Becker (1978) make some provocative points regarding development of theoretical models that accomodate garbage can perspectives. Daft and Becker began their longitudinal study of 13 high school districts with a theoretical model in which important environmental and organizational variables were identified. Near the close of their book they confess:

We thought naively, that with appropriate incentives and enablers, across a variety of organizational settings, and for any and all innovations, the same kind of people would do the proposing and the same kind of others the adopting. Neat, simple, precise, and predictable - but wrong.

We did not foresee the disorganized nature of the innovation process... The innovation processes seem to be rational for the organization in the sense that they yield innovations in line with with organizational goals, but these processes are not rational in the classical sense of a felt problem followed by search and then the careful consideration of several alternatives.

A revised theory of organizational innovation is needed...

In reviewing our findings, we are struck by the compatibility between them and two depictions, of organizational processes; Cohen, March, and Olsen's garbage can model of organizational decision-making and Weick's view of educational organizations as loosely coupled systems. A loosely coupled system is one in which the subparts are relatively independent, so that actions taken in one subpart have little effect, or are relatively slow to effect, another part. Weick noted that the idea of loose coupling is evoked by such terms (among others) as decentralization, delegation, and planned unresponsiveness. He deduced that loosely coupled systems preserve independent sensing elements, know their environments better and hence respond quickly, although this could lead to many faddish responses; that they may be good for localized adoptions but as a result lose the benefits of standardization; that they can retain more novel solutions, but their diffusion through the organization might be difficult.

...

The garbage can model was devised to explain decision behavior in organized anarchies, organizations characterized by problematic preferences, unclear technology, and fluid participation. Organized anarchies experience uncertainty about specific organizational goals and about how to achieve goals. Alternatives may be inconsistent and ill defined. Consequently, decision makers do not necessarily take action on the basis of preferences. They may discover what they prefer by taking action and learning what works. Unclear technology leads to considerable trial-and-error behavior as a device for finding preferences. Organized anarchies are also characterized by fluid participation. Organization members come and go, and with them travel perceptions, ideas, problems, and experiences. For participants within the system there are diverse demands upon their energy, so that participation in specific problems is also fluid. Under these conditions, "one can view a choice opportunity as a garbage can into which various kinds of probproblems and solutions are dumped" (Cohen, March, and Olsen, 1972, p. 2).

> Cohen, March, and Olsen applied the garbage can model to university organizations. High school organizations probably do not display the characteristics of organized anarchies to the extent universities do. But goals in high school education are by no means precise, nor is the technology used to achieve educational goals. And fluid participation does occur...
>
> The important theoretical breakthrough of the garbage can model is that it disconnects problems, solutions, and decisions makers from each other, unlike traditional decision theory. Specific decisions do not follow an orderly process from problem to solution but are outcomes of several relatively independent streams of events within the organizations.
>
> ... A solution may not solve the problem when cause and effect relationships are uncertain. The decision to adopt is then only a temporary garbage can in which to dispose of that problem. Further, many problems hang around organized anarchies and do not stimulate search at all. There may be more problems than can be processed at any one time. Some problems will not receive attention because other pressing problems push ahead in the queue. Other problems are dormant in the organization. Organization members get accustomed to them and no longer think of them as requiring search and solution. On the other hand, organization participants may occasionally preoccupy themselves with specific problems that they believe are critically important, and consequently they maintain continuous search behavior and attach solution after solution to the problem in an attempt to resolve it.
>
> Solutions are innovation ideas. The stream of innovation ideas into and through the organization exists independent of problems. Ideas may be brought into the organization by new personnel or they may be discovered [or invented] by existing personnel... Attraction to an idea may cause the member to look for a problem to which the innovation can be attached as a solution, or the participant may present the idea as an opportunity for improved organizational performance. Under conditions of uncertainty, ideas can be tried in order to learn if they are preferable to existing procedure.
>
> (Daft and Becker, 1977, pp. 164-169.)

Preferences for procedures rather than results is the important idea here.

Freeman (1979) states that:

> The fundamental problem in the provision of education services is that the technology of learning is poorly understood [Dreekin, 1970]. Because no one knows why one technique works well and another works poorly or

> under what conditions any technique works best, districts and schools within them rely upon teacher professionalism and essentially decouple levels in the hierarchy [Weick, 1976; Meyer et al., 1978]. This makes educational organizations particularly subject to outside criticism so that principals, superintendents, and school boards are much involved in public relations in which procedural rationality is stressed because substantive rationality is impossible [Bidwell, 1965; Meyer and Rowen, 1977]. Put simply, if you do not know why some technological option works, or fails to work, you defend its use on procedural grounds, rather than in terms of its results.
>
> School districts are vulnerable to outside criticism because it is difficult for them to demonstrate their effectiveness and because there are almost infinite alternatives that can be advocated by various interest groups. On the other hand, the critics cannot affect change easily because they can not make a strong enough case. The anarchial tendencies of educational organizations can be used to thwart them...
>
> (Freeman, 1979, pp. 120-121.)

As we have noted, organized anarchies are organizations characterized by problematic preferences, unclear technology, and fluid participation. The original garbage can statement (Cohen, March and Olsen, 1972) describes these three characteristics in these terms:

> In the [anarchial] organization it is difficult to impute a set of preferences to the decision that satisfies the standard consistency requirement for a [classical] theory of choice. The organization operates on the basis of a variety of inconsistent and ill-defined preferences. It can be described better as a loose collection of ideas than coherent structure; it discovers preferences through action more than it acts on the basis of preference.
>
> The second property is unclear technology. Although the organization manages to survive and even produce, its own processes are not understood by its members. It operates on the basis of trial-and-error procedure, the residue of learning from the accidents of past experience, and pragmatic inventions of necessity.
>
> The third property is fluid participation. Participants vary in time and effort they devote to different domains; involvement varies from one time to another. As a result, the boundaries of the organization are uncertain and changing; the audiences and decision makers for any particular kind of choice change capriciously.

> These properties of organized anarchy have been identified often in studies of organization. They are characteristics of any organization in part -- part of the time. They are particulary conspicuous in public, educational, and illegitimate organizations. A theory of organized anarchy will describe a portion of almost any organization's activities, but will not describe all of them.
>
> (Cohen, March, and Olsen, p. 1)

In this article, the authors describe the garbage can process in which problems, solutions, and participants move from one choice opportunity to another. The streams of problems, solutions, choice opportunities, and participants are channeled by organizational and social structures. These structures influence outcomes by affecting the timing of the arrival of problems, solutions, choices, or decision makers, by determining the allocation of attention and energy by potential participants; and by establishing linkages among the various streams. Organizations regulate connections among problems, choice opportunities, solutions, and energy of participants by organizational mechanisms and administrative practice. Since an organization can attend to only a fraction of available information, it creates mechanisms for increasing sensitivity to some kinds of information and insensitivity to others. Mechanisms are developed for ascribing meaning, relevance, and priority to different types of inputs. Hierarchy, specialization, systematic channeling of information, agenda-building and allocation of authority are all devices for regulating the connections among the four streams (problems, choice opportunities, solutions, participants), and for avoiding unexpected connections. These organizational structures are the result of deliberate planning, individual and collective learning, and imitation.

Development of organizational (and interorganizational) structures usually takes time. And, in the absence of preestablished structural

patterns, it also requires the attention of significant decision makers to develop, implement, and maintain workable structures. Consequently, it seems likely that garbage can processes may be more commonly found in "new" organizational or interorganizational contexts, and it also seems likely that they will persist longer and be more pervasive where either (a) the stakes at issue are relatively unimportant to stakeholders, or (b) authority and responsibility for decisions and actions are ill defined or broadly distributed. These are conditions that characterize much of the educational "knowledge utilization" and educational "practice improvement" field. The professional educational researcher, evaluator, disseminator, and change agent are all relatively new to the field of education. They exist and thrive in garbage can situations involving loosely coupled social systems, but, perversely, they tend to employ classical models of rationality, linear and tightly coupled system models, and goal-based methods to guide much of their work.

Configurational Perspectives, Goal-Free Methods, and Adaptive Procedures.

The concepts of organized anarchies, loosely coupled systems, and garbage can decision processes have been applied most frequently to particular organizations in the field of education. Clark and Guba (1974) and Clark (1977) have attended to the multi-organizational situation, especially with respect to educational knowledge production and utilization. Clark (1977) succinctly summarized the Clark and Guba argument and then made several suggestions that drew heavily from Scriven's ideas regarding goal-free evaluation. Clark notes that the central thrust of The Configurational Perspective: A View of Educational Knowledge Production and Utilization (Clark and Guba, 1974) was that the dominant systems planning perspective (RDDA) and

the configurational view (CV) both met the criterion of completeness, but that the systems view was inadequate in respect to the criteria of:

1. Balance--by failing to respond to individual and institutional goals of agents and agencies involved in educational KPU.

2. Realism--by making unrealistic assumptions about the nature of the agencies involved in educational KPU and the kind of functional relationships existing among them.

The authors contended that a planning system based upon the configurational view would have characteristics dissimilar from most federally-funded program planning and policy structures in educational KPU, to wit:

- Participatory planning
- Decentralized design
- Flexible administration
- Post facto functional interagency linkages in contrast with engineered a priori linkages
- Overlapping agency and individual roles
- Collegial rather than hierarchical status designations for agency participants in KPU
- Goal diversity and redefinition
- Negotiation of interagency authority and responsibility relationships
- Intrinsic rather than extrinsic agency and individual commitment to KPU
- Symbolic and temporary agency and individual interactions rather than synergistic and permanent interactions.

A substantial effort was made to argue that the needed reorientation was conceptual and not technical--that the problem was not simply one of "beating down" the systems proponent issue-by-issue, but rather of assuming a new posture that reflects an awareness of the real world of educational KPU, i.e.:

> The systems proponent would regard such non-systems characteristics as obstacles to be overcome, barriers to be struck down, conditions to be ameliorated. The configurationist, conversely, is more likely to see them as channels through which KPU activity must be guided; constraints by which the creative bursts of KPU must be disciplined; keys which must be utilized to unlock KPU potential. In short, the systems proponent views such characteristics as intractable; the configurationist sees them as malleable.
>
> (Clark and Guba, 1974, p. 61.)

In reviewing their monograph three years later, it seemed to Clark that the argument supporting the genesis and foundation of the systems view placed far too heavy an emphasis on the influence of the RDDA continuum. The problem went far beyond this one linear model. Indeed, the reliance on simplistic rationalism in planning is so embedded in our thinking that we read nonsense paragraphs about planning, nod to one another that they are assuredly true, and, worse yet, act as if they were true. A goal-based national program typically assumes: 1) concurrence in and understanding of desired end states; 2) empirical data on the resources and potential productivity of participating agents and agencies; 3) evaluative data on competitive plans; 4) requisite technical and instrumental knowledge about program implementation; and 5) predictive certainty about internal and external impact factors that might affect the program. In Clark's opinion,

> Such assumptions, for all practical purposes, never exist in any social process field. If we can learn from our past experience in educational planning we should be able to reject systems-oriented, goal-based planning and substitute in its stead a more flexible, responsive planning structure which emphasizes <u>needs</u> and <u>capacity</u> analysis and which is <u>balanced</u> and <u>realistic</u>.
>
> (Clark, 1977, p. 6.)

Clark identified three "erroneous zones" of current planning efforts and suggested what might be done to reduce their impact on subsequent planning efforts:

1. Systematism in Planning--The CV argues that agents and agencies which will carry out KPU or D&U functions in education do not now have and are unlikely to assume the characteristics of an operating system in terms of their hierarchical relationships, mission orientations in D&U, structural roles, or regularized interactions. Planning for D&U which either assumes such characteristics or attempts to impose them externally will fail on the grounds typical of failure for such programs, i.e.: (a) either through the manipulation and misuse of external funds by the recipient agency to attain its own ends, or (b) by the demise of the program as soon as the external stimulus of funds is reduced or removed.

   Alternative--One can imagine orderly, logical, and rational planning without systematism. All educational agencies have some extant D&U resources, some institutional commitment to D&U in education, and some potential for more extensive involvement in D&U assuming external support and stimulation. The object of the planning game vis-a-vis agents and agencies ought to be to identify these resources and this potential and to design a plan to fit them rather than to modify the agents and agencies to fit an a priori plan. The success of a plan in this respect ought to be judged on the extent to which it opens up and maximizes participation of agents and agencies in D&U activity.

2. The Master Plan--The master planner strives to achieve both comprehensiveness and permanence in his/her planning venture. These unattainable criteria both demand closure in planning. If the plan is to leave "no stone unturned" then all the stones must be identified. If the plan is to persist it must not be modified. The concession of the master planner to the real world is that the master plan be evaluated periodically and adjusted to fit its failures and successes. But this brings us back to the GFE [Goal-Free Evaluation] propositions--the successes and failures are determined by the congruence of effects with the a priori goals and are likely to overlook much of what is going on that was not envisioned initially. There is no doubt but that the plans projected as comprehensive and permanent assume values in the eyes of the planners and decision makers which make adjustments and alterations in course extremely difficult to achieve.

   Alternative--Even decision makers accustomed to master plans can accommodate shorter, more flexible time frames if it can be demonstrated that well organized planning probes will yield data on which subsequent planning can be based. I think I would consider the alternative to the master plan to be a sort of iterative plan under which the assumption is made that documentation of practice in the real world (e.g., the Pilot State Dissemination Program) will yield data which will challenge the conventional wisdom and prior empirical findings and set the stage for a subsequent short time frame

plan which is more sophisticated than any that could now be generated. I would assume further that this process is, essentially, endless.

3. Goal-Based Planning--Nothing seems more logical or rational than that plans be goal-based. But as was noted in the preceding section, the goal-based plan makes assumptions about the knowledge base in a field [where such assumptions] are almost never correct, i.e., goal-based planning is almost never realistic planning. As a matter of fact, goal-based planning is almost always planning based on wishful thinking. It emphasizes the attainment of a desired end state without assessing the reasonable capacity of agents and agencies to attain that end state. There are frequently temporary political advantages to be gained from describing such end states, but when it be comes evident to all that the end state specified is unattainable, the political advantage is lost in the mad scramble to assign blame to those who failed to achieve it.

   Alternative--Scriven has offered some clues to an alternative to goal-based planning in his efforts to defend GFE.* His Pathway Comparison Model suggests that programs, projects, and, for our purposes, plans can be characterized in terms of their major dimensions, e.g., program nature, likely results, cost, etc., and can be validated by comparison with critical, competitive alternatives and an assess- of client needs being met. I do not wish to attempt to push the analog too far, but it does seem that a description of client needs and agency capacity to respond to needs with a projected description of how, in general, this might change over a short time frame could be devised to substitute for the goal-based planning statements which have caused such difficulties in the past. The concept that such planning could be evaluated to provide data on what Scriven describes as "merit," i.e., the extent to which needs are being served and capacity is being expanded, sounds more practical in terms of communicating with Congressmen than our past efforts to supply gross and inadequate data in support of the accomplishment of vague and grandiose goals.

Berman (1978) has arrived at a complementary view in considering the problem of implementing social policies. He identifies two schools of thought and practice that have developed in response to the failure to implement policies in education, health, welfare, and other social areas.

---

* Scriven, M. "Prose and Cons about Goal-Free Evaluation." Evaluation Comment, December 1976.

One view, programmed implementation, assumes that implementation problems can be reduced by careful and explicit preprogramming of implementation procedures. The other view, adaptive implemention, holds that policy execution can be improved by processes that enable initial plans to be adapted to unfolding events and decisions. After a discussion of each approach, Berman proposes five parameters that capture critically different contingencies which affect the effectiveness of the implementation approach:

Contingent Characteristic of Situation	Implementation Approach	
	Programmed	Adaptive
Scope of Change	minor	major
Certainty of Technology or Theory	certain, within risk	uncertain
Conflict over Policy's Goals or Means	low conflict	high conflict
Structure of Institutional Setting	tightly coupled	loosely coupled
Stability of Environment	stable	unstable

Berman states:

> Specifically, if all the following conditions in the policy situation hold, then a programmed approach seems appropriate:
>
> [1] The scope of change, implied by the policy, in the behavior of members of the implementing system is marginal;
>
> [2] The validity of the policy's technology (or theory) is relatively certain;
>
> [3] Members of the implementing system generally agree on the policy's goals and means;
>
> [4] The coordination structure of the implementing system is tightly coupled;
>
> [5] The implementing system's environment is relatively stable.
>
> However, if any of these conditions are replaced by those in the right hand column [above], elements of adaptive implementation strategies are appropriate.
>
> (Berman, 1978, p. 14)

Where policy involves major change, existing routines have to be redesigned, replaced, or sidestepped. Programmed approaches can be expected to generate resistance to change. Adaptive implementation would try to ameliorate resistance by affording extensive participation in the decision process so that implementors help to develop new standard operating procedures. It would deal with the need to learn by doing, by giving deliverers discretion, as well as not holding them accountable to an initial plan.

When the validity of technology or theory is uncertain, programmed strategy can lead to severe implementation problems that are created, ironically, by the strategy itself. Besides causing poblems, the programmed approach fails to assist deliverers in reducing technological uncertainty by constraining their ability to adjust to unique and unpredictable elements. Adaptive implementation gives deliverers discretion to allow the technology to evolve with the particularities of the implementing system and its contexts.

A programmed approach in a conflictual situation may backfire, generating resistance, disregard, or pro forma compliance. An adaptive approach deals with conflict by assuming that implementation requires bargaining among the interested parties.

In a tightly coupled setting, programmed approaches are possible because an established pattern of compliance exists. But when applied to a loosely coupled setting, a programmed approach can lead to symbolic compliance or cooptation. The adaptive approach in a loosely coupled situation provides tolerance for bargaining and adjustment over time, avoids strict adherence to uniform regulations, expects and encourages local agencies to adapt to central policy in ways suitable to local conditions, and seeks local participation in policy development.

It is hard for a programmed approach to build in contingency plans to cope with environmental changes. A programmed approach seems suitable to stable environments, but an adaptive strategy is needed for unstable conditions (e.g., court orders, changes in governmental regulations, Proposition 13, loss of a program advocate, a teachers' strike). Such unforeseen events may cause only temporary disturbance for overall operations of a local organization, but they may profoundly affect implementation.

Berman concludes:

> To summarize, we believe the effective execution of policy requires implementation strategies that match policy situations, especially the policy's scope of change, its degree of technical certainty, the extent of agreement over the policy, the coordination structure of the implementing system, and the stability of environmental conditions. The strategic approaches, programmed and adaptive implementation, are really repertoires of techniques and points of view about how to treat such variables as clarity, participation, and discretion. This essay has argued at length that a programmed approach applied to a basically adaptive situation exacerbates, rather than solves, implementation problems. Conversely, an adaptive approach in a programmed situation can be inefficient and ineffective.
>
> (Op. cit., p. 27.)

Commentary

In the above sections we have briefly described several new perspectives on planning, management, and evaluation as they may apply to school improvement efforts. Karl Weick's concept of loosely coupled systems, March and Olsen's concepts of anarchical organizations and garbage can decision processes, Clark and Guba's configurational perspective, and Berman's contingency framework provide useful analytical frameworks for examining and attempting to understand complex organizational planning and change processes. But, March's idea of a technology of foolishness has been carried further than elaboration of analytical frameworks. Scriven has suggested how we can perform goal-free evaluation. Clark has elaborated

on Scriven's ideas by proposing approaches for goal-free planning. Berman has begun the elaboration of adaptive methods for social policy implementation that combine planning, management, and evaluation interactively. March's call for a technology of foolishness has generated new perspectives and may soon produce a useable technolgy for planning, management, and evaluation that would be more suitable in adaptive situations. The challenge to be confronted in this workshop is how may these ideas be applied to inter-organizational efforts directed toward school improvement?

SECTION II

THE 1979 FAR WEST LABORATORY SUMMER WORKSHOP ON EDUCATIONAL DISSEMINATION AND SCHOOL IMPROVEMENT

Overview. On July 2-3, 1979 Paul Berman, Davis Campbell, David Clark, Michael Scriven, and Karl Weick met with Far West Laboratory staff from the Regional Service Program and the Educational Systems Support Program to develop a plan for the content and organization of a July 23-25 workshop. An agenda was developed that provided for a planned, but flexible sequence of activities that would: start with informal presentations by each of the four presenters, move to reactions and discussion of the various ideas by other participants, provide time for further commentary by presenters, include examination of several school improvement case studies in terms of "new perspectives," and conclude with consideration of possible follow-up activities.

Agenda. The actual agenda was as follows.

[MONDAY, JULY 23]

1. A Call for New Perspectives - Paul Hood
2. Overview of New Perspectives in Organizational Theory - Karl Weick
3. Discussion of Weick's Presentation
4. A New Perspective on Implementation In Design: Adaptive Implementation - Paul Berman
5. Discussion of Berman's Presentation
6. A New Perspective on National Planning for School Improvement Programs: The Configurational Perspective and Goal-Free Planning - David Clark
7. Discussion of Clark's Presentation
8. Newer Perspectives on the Evaluation of School Improvement Programs: Goal-Free Evaluation; School Evaluation Profile - Michael Scriven

9. Discussion of Scriven's Presentation
10. General Discussion of all Presentations

[TUESDAY, JULY 24]

1. Consensus Across the Perspectives - Carolyn Cates
2. Discussion
3. Issues and Problems Raised by the Presentations - Anne Huff
4. Discussion
5. Evaluation and Adaptive Implementation - Paul Berman
6. Marginal Glosses - Karl Weick

[WEDNESDAY, JULY 25]

1. Brief Commentary on a Bibliography - Karl Weick
2. Two School Improvement Case Studies - Ann Lieberman
3. Commentary on the School Improvement Case Studies
4. Two Case Studies of Program Implementation in a State Educational Agency - Sue McKibbin
5. Commentary on the State Agency Case Studies
6. Designing Next Steps

[ADJOURN]

MONDAY, JULY 23rd SESSION

A Call for New Perspectives, Paul Hood

This presentation briefly reviewed the rationale, planning, purposes and proposed agenda for the workshop, and also highlighted some of the ideas presented in the "New Perspectives" orientation paper. Since this content is contained in the previous two sections, it is not repeated here.

Overview of New Perspectives in Organizational Theory
by Karl E. Weick, Graduate School of Business and
Public Administration, Cornell University

There are several images of new ideas about organizations that are in the literature now. They are tentative, but they seem to have relevance for this workshop. First, I'd like to introduce a notion of "theoretical complexity" that provides a basis for examining our prior assumptions. Then, I want to discuss four topics:

- Organized anarchies and garbage cans
- Loose coupling
- Assumptions used by neo-rational writers
- Applications of these ideas to school improvement.

Theoretical Complexity. Warren Thorngate has suggested that it is not possible for any explanation of social behavior to be simultaneously general, accurate, and simple.* These three characteristics can be considered as three locations on a clock (see Figure 1.1). Imagine that at twelve o'clock you have generality, at four o'clock you have accuracy, and at eight o'clock you have simplicity.

FIGURE 1.1

THORNGATE'S IMPOSSIBILITY POSTULATE



* W. Thorngate. Possible Limits on a Science of Social Behavior. Edmonton, Alberta: Department of Psychology, January 1975.

Now you can see that if you pick any two of these characteristics, say at two o'clock, you come up with an explanation that's got a lot of generality and a lot of accuracy. Many explanations of organizations fall right at that position. But note that they are as far away from being a simple rendition of a problem as you can possibly get. You can look at concepts of "loose coupling" or "garbage cans;" they fall at about ten o'clock. They've got a lot of generality to them. They are also simple, you remember them easily, but you go out and try to spot them as loose coupling or a garbage can decision process and you always have to put amendments in there, little qualifiers, and so forth, because the concepts don't have much accuracy.

This is not only a theoretical situation, it also has practical implications. It helps to explain the reason for our dissatisfaction with much organizational research and also our difficulty in making sense out of practical problems when we confront complex organizations. For example, simple theories or explanations, if they are moderately accurate, probably aren't very general. Their accuracy is achieved by fitting them to specific situations. Conversely, highly general propositions about organizations will probably suffer by being complex (not simple), inaccurate, or both.

The ideas that follow must confront Thorngate's dilemma. Most of these ideas are deceptively simple and general. They are about at ten o'clock. However, some of this apparent simplicity and generality may be lost as we attempt to achieve an accurate fit of these ideas to school improvement applications.

Organized Anarchies and Garbage Cans. Garbage can decision situations arise when there are unclear goals and/or unclear technology. We can relate this to organized anarchies with this schematic (see Figure 1.2).

FIGURE 1.2

THE GARBAGE CAN AND THE ORGANIZED ANARCHY



In organized anarchies, organizations are tied together more by independent, temporal flows than by logical, rational, planned connections among people, solutions, problems and choices. We need to ask how well these models apply to elementary and secondary education as opposed to higher education, where most examples are found.

It may also be instructive to examine Organizing an Anarchy (Sproull, Weiner, and Wolf, 1978) which provides a detailed application of the anarchy model to describe the early years of the National Institute of Education (NIE). In reading this book I had some reactions. First, the defining characteristics of an organized anarchy are unclear goals, unclear technology and fluid participation, but over time other characteristics have been added. What are the properties? March himself sees different organizational characteristics in place of unclear goals and technology as crucial in anarchies.

Second, what was the sequence at NIE: organizing an anarchy or anarchizing an organization? There seemed to be a core of order to start with. Maybe NIE went from order to anarchy. There was a rational core, but people took chunks and decoupled them little by little. There were

oases of orderliness which resulted in routines, places where things were tight or predictable. Because of this orderliness, it was possible for chaos to develop elsewhere. What are the implications for school administrators? Maybe the advice would be to:

1. Identify the routines and spot the orderly places.
2. Find how to buffer these areas.
3. Then don't worry so much about chaos in other areas of the organization becuase people will "get the bearings" from the orderly places.

Loose Coupling. Loose coupling is a general characterization, almost a projective device. It's astounding how much mileage people get out of this idea. Howard Aldrich (1978) has provided a metaphor that may help to visualize degrees of coupling. Imagine a room full of mouse traps that have been set with ping pong balls on them. Trip one of the traps. Other traps will spring in succession all over the room and balls will be flying everywhere. That's tight coupling. Now decouple the situation by introducing some shields and barriers. Now with traps reset, fewer ping pong balls spring into the air. Here's another metaphor. Imagine a triangular table with a knob (O) at each corner that raises or lowers the leg at that corner. Now let's place three people at the corners with a spirit level (—) in front of each person (see Figures 1.3a and 1.3b).

A LOOSE COUPLING METAPHOR

FIGURE 1.3a



Tight coupling,
maximum interdependence

FIGURE 1.3b



Loose coupling,
less interdependence

In Figure 1.3a, each person's level is dependent on how the other two persons move their knobs. But, in Figure 1.3b each person can directly control their own level. The 1.3a situation can be made even more loosely coupled if we increase the viscosity in the spirit level.

Here are some loose coupling images. Consider the general proposition, "If A, then B."

a) maybe 

b) eventually 

c) negligibly 

Large changes in A may produce only small changes in B.

d) partly 

Other forces (w, z) affect B also.

e) gradually 

If we look early, we may not see much change in B.

f) suddenly 

Here are some other characteristics of loosely coupled systems.

1. There may be a spread of leadership, not absence of leadership or an anarchy. This leads to plural improvisation which works if there is some prior consensus on general directions.

2. No system can be more tightly coupled than its weakest links. (If it's a linear chain?)

3. Coupling is not usually "all/none." Don't look at an organization as being all tight or loosely coupled. Look at different parts of the

organization and expect variations in the degree of coupling. There are often patterns of tightness and looseness.

4. Stability is important. It is often useful to be independent of momentary environmental changes. This leads to more stability. There are two ideas of environmental coupling (see Figure 1.4).

FIGURE 1.4

TWO TYPES OF ORGANIZATION TO ENVIRONMENT COUPLING



In 1.4a there is an equilibrium, an intimate tie with the environment, and a responsiveness of the organization to environmental changes. In 1.4b there is loose coupling. The whole organization doesn't respond, perhaps one part does, but the organization is partly disengaged.

Karl Pribram invokes a similar distinction by identifying two ways of coping with environmental changes:

1) preparation - closing off the world

2) participation - opening up to the world.

Assumptions of the New Perspectives. There are a number of assumptions that these alternative models of organizations tend to share.

1. Organizations provide sets of procedures for argumentation and interpretation. The focus of perspectives is often on organizational language and symbolism rather than organizational goals and instrumentalities.

2. The environment is more often viewed as an output from an organization and not something independent of it. It is not environmental determinism.

In these new perspectives, it is less explicit what organizations have to deal with. These new views hold that there is often a belated, retrospective understanding of what the environmental press was and how and why the organization reacted.

3. In these perspectives, there is much emphasis on small changes that get amplified, sometimes in vicious circles, e.g.,



4. There is a tolerance for waste and inefficiency. They imply that organizational slack may provide a way of adapting to the next change.

5. Time is a scarce resource. To understand an organization is to see how people allocate their time. Heretofore, time use in organizations has not been well studied.

6. Market mechanisms and crude evolutionary models, e.g., "social Darwinism," are often invoked as ways to understand order amidst chaos. Because there is loose coupling or independence among the variations themselves, certain things will survive and others will fall by the wayside. Are schools evolutionary systems? Where would marketing notions apply?

Applications to School Improvement Efforts.

1. Help people accept that there will be ambiguity and anarchy somewhere in the system. This is acceptance of reality.

2. In situations where there is ambiguity, loose coupling, and uncertainty, encourage people to take highly visible, conspicuous action. It is also important to control images and labels. In uncertain situations people turn to one another, and label or define actions and events in order to make sense of them. Consequently language, metaphors, images, and labels are important definers of reality.

3. Persistence in action is needed. Repeated assertions and labels, and good attendance at meetings will result in disproportional influence on organizational decision making.

4. What happens to control in schools?

   a. Look for opportunities for subtle control - agendas, calendars, labels.

   b. Do without control

   c. Spot deviating, counteracting, or self-correcting loops. Most people only look for the positive linkages, instead of the stable loops. The latter are often harder to spot. Look for +→- or -→+, e.g., criticism quality of performance.

5. Actions define goals. Action is goal interpreted rather than goal driven. Goals are ways of making sense out of prior action.

Reactions and Discussion of Weick Presentation

P. BERMAN: I'm impressed by the subtlety, variety, and richness of these ideas. Regarding the images of loose coupling, if a thing is as loose as its weakest link, it sounds tight. Stability seems to be enhanced by loose coupling.

K. WEICK: In part loose coupling provides a response to the systems enthusiasts who assert that everything is connected.

D. CLARK: A part of it is the "fit," spread of leadership, and multiple inputs.

P. BERMAN: Regarding the market model image, in economics, where the market model has failed to provide a satisfactory explanation, we have looked for other models. I think we may be missing something if loose coupling means only the opposite of tight coupling.

M. SCRIVEN: The "logic of possible causes" is more useful in the social sciences than the "logic of ironclad laws." In the philosophy of history there has been a revolt over the use of scientific models. This view ties in with the retrospective description of what happened. Social science explanations may not be as much predictions as they are explanations.

W. MASON: I get the idea that the name of the game is avoiding disaster rather than solving problems; does this leave something out? Is engagement/disengagement to be sought when resources are rich/sparse?

K. WEICK: The imagery of organized anarchies is more of managing problems than solving problems. The problem solving image is a bad one to use in thinking about complex organizations; they move problems around, interpret them, avoid them, but seldom solve them. How can you create an organization where some failures are safe? Safe-fail systems are essential. In tightly coupled systems you need redundancy. In loosely coupled systems, isolated failures may not be such a problem. Complex organizations learn to diffuse problems, to live with them, or to define them out of existence.

B. BANATHY: I am reminded of George Miller's ideas of systems being open vs. closed; for examples the notions of "resilience," and of deviation amplifying loops. Open organizations must find ways to promote deviations; for example, Proposition 13 in California has created a need for schools to think about new ways of securing resources.

A New Perspective on Implementation Design: Adaptive Implementation

by Paul Berman, School of Public Policy, University of California, Berkeley

Background. As I've read the literature in various areas, it is clear that most socia' action programs over the past 10 to 15 years have "failed." Why? The prevalent diagnosis is that "implementation" failed. There's a long list of implementation problems. There's also great pessimism regarding social action programs.

My view is not so pessimistic. In our Rand change studies we encountered some successes. I've begun to think that more attention should be addressed to the "prescriptive" problem. What I'm going to say is a brief summary of a longer paper (Berman, in preparation) that is a revision of the earlier one Paul Hood cited (Berman, 1978).

Two schools of thought and practice have developed regarding the design of implementation strategies for social programs. One view, which could be called programmed implementation, assumes that implementation problems can be made more tolerable, if not eliminated, by careful and explicit preprogramming of implementation procedures. The other view, which could be called adaptive implementation, holds that policy execution can be improved by processes that enable initial plans to be adapted to unfolding events and decisions. The debate between these two kinds of approaches is kind of funny because there is no one best way; it depends on the match between the strategy and the situation. Thinking about matching strategy to situations led me to examine each approach and when each should be applied. In this presentation I'm going to idealize pure forms of each approach. But reality is much more complex, and I'll look at that only briefly later when we consider implementation strategies that mix, match, or switch approaches. This leads to three questions I want to address.

1. What are the characteristics of each approach?
2. What are the conditions/contingencies for the use of each approach? and
3. What are the conditions/contingencies for mixing or switching approaches?

I'll briefly outline my ideas regarding the first two questions, and then leave the last question for our discussion period.

Let's consider the programmed approach first. On the left side I'll list the situation diagnosis and on the right I'll identify the corresponding prescriptions made by this approach (see Figure 2.1).

FIGURE 2.1

PROGRAMMED APPROACH

Situation Diagnosis	Prescription
1. Unclear goals.	1. Formulate specific, detailed objectives and guidelines, (e.g., PPBS, MBO).
2. Unclear authority and too many actors.	2. Specify lines of authority (e.g., SOPs), minimize number of decision makers, and match authority and responsibility.
3. Deliverers resists program or are ineffective.	3a. Formulate tight SOPs. 3b. Introduce monitoring and accountability procedures. 3c. Change rewards and penalties to go with SOPs. 3d. Develop extensive contingency plans.

Now let's contrast this with the adaptive approach (see Figure 2.2).

FIGURE 2.2

ADAPTIVE APPROACH

Situation Diagnosis	Prescription
1. Overspecification of goals and rigidity of goals.	1. Settle for a vague, general agreement on goals or even agreement on means. Try for tacit agreement over the rules of the game. Strive for negotiation and clarification of goals and means during implementation.
2. Failure to energize relevant actors.	2. Concentrate on mobilizing broad-based support of those who will be involved in the implementation.
3. Excessive control over deliverers.	3. Allow for learning-by-doing by deliverers.

To recap, the programmed approach specifies objectives, goals, and SOPs for deliverers, develops contingency plans, and uses monitoring systems. The adaptive approach allows for progressive evolution of goals and rules, allows for learning, and for broad participation.

Matching Approaches to Situations. Each approach is appropriate for different situations. So under what conditions/contingencies should each approach be used? It seems that there are five parameters that capture critically different dimensions of the policy situation (see Figure 2.3).

I've chosen parameters that are abstract in order to encompass a wide spectrum of social policies, but they could be specified in detail for concrete situations. Note that to decide on an implementation approach all five parameters need to be considered simultaneously. If a policy situation were characterized by all of the values in the figure's middle column, a programmed approach would be desirable; but if a policy situation were characterized by any right hand column values, adaptive strategies should be considered.

FIGURE 2.3

MATCHING IMPLEMENTATION APPROACHES TO POLICY SITUATIONS

SITUATIONAL PARAMETER	IMPLEMENTATION APPROACH	
	Programmed	Adaptative
Scope of Change	minor	major
Certainty of Technology or Theory	certain within risk	uncertain
Conflict over Policy's Goals & Means	low conflict	high conflict
Structure of Institutional Setting	tightly coupled	loosely coupled
Stability of Environment	stable	unstable

Since Paul Hood has already summarized my discussion of these parameters in an earlier paper (Berman, 1978) [see pp. 16-18 in SECTION I and my revised paper (Berman, in preparation) has been distributed, it may be more useful to go immediately to discussion.

Reactions and Discussion of Berman Presentation

M. SCRIVEN: I'm interested in the role that evaluation plays in the two approaches. Obviously the goal-based evaluator has something of a problem if confronted with an adaptive approach, but the goal-free evaluator would be comfortable with either approach. My sense is that most situations tend toward the adaptive side. It may be interesting to take a harder look at the use of case studies of change.

B. BANATHY: What about parameters such as freedom to make change, resources available, and the ability to commit resources?

P. BERMAN: I don't see resources as being a relevant variable. If there is a lack of resources, then neither approach may work.

P. DARO: What about level of trust? Is it high or low?

J. HEMPHILL: And isn't there often a conflict between adaptive notions and the actuality of programmed approaches as embedded in law and policy?

P. BERMAN: Maybe there is a necessary "acceptability" level for the adaptive approach. There may have to be a Machivellian cast in this. As Karl Weick has indicated, images are important. Perhaps you should dress up adaptive approaches in programmed guises.

J. HEMPHILL: Maybe when we are proposing concepts such as "loosely coupled," we should also look at "badly coupled."

W. MASON: In the implementation literature, implementation is used in two ways: a) what happened to the innovation; was there fidelity of adoption or some form of adaptation? and b) the approach used. Which of these do you mean?

P. BERMAN: Both. In programmed approaches we can invoke the concept of "fidelity," but that concept doesn't make sense in an adaptive approach except as fidelity of an adaptive process.

A. LIEBERMAN: Are these ideal types generic to any level?

P. BERMAN: Levels are important. I conceptualize a continuum of implementation levels from macro-implementation (e.g., federal programs) to micro-implementation (e.g., in one school). Macro policy is affected by micro-implementation problems. For example, the local agency may not be able to implement the program as prescribed, there may be slippage, different local agencies may disagree. Here's a figure that may help to depict some of the possibilities (see figure 2.4).

FIGURE 2.4

THREE DIMENSIONS OF POLICY IMPLEMENTATION



We need to consider what approach, or mix of approaches, is appropriate at the macro and micro levels during each phase (mobilization, implementation, institutionalization), as well as how the levels and phases interact. We may want different strategies in each phase. If so, there may be some interesting switching problems in shifting from one to the other approach.

D. CLARK: I'm sure that it seems natural to think of programmed implementation at higher levels of implementation design and the adaptive approach at local levels. After all, system designers and managers are the "enforcers" and the program implementers are the "enforcees." It is probably true that there tend to be two pictures of the real world of implementation held by actors at different levels (see Figure 2.5).

FIGURE 2.5

TWO VIEWS OF IMPLEMENTATION



But we should not fall into the trap of thinking that what seems natural is appropriate. Our experience tells us that many, perhaps most, macro-level implementation designs would be more effective if they were based upon adaptive implementation. Conversely, one could argue that you are more likely to find Berman's conditions for programmed implementation in micro-level settings. We still have much to learn about how to mix which elements at what levels--what environmental conditions foster adaptive or programmed behavior.

K. WEICK: This helps me to identify one common theme of those using loose coupling images. They simultaneously look at both aspects of the situation. Some aspects of the organization (e.g., in education, assignment of positions, designation of courses, scheduling of classes, promotion that) are programmed "ceremonially," while other aspects of the organization (e.g., the instructional process) are decoupled. It is in the area of these decoupled processes where the adaptive approaches are found. Schools survive because they do both, but they decouple the administrative core (where

programmed approaches dominate) from the teaching core (where adaptive approaches dominate). Schools have to look programmed before the public, and yet be adaptive in the classroom. You don't do a little of each approach; you don't mix them; rather you create a division of labor, and decouple. In organizational theory you usually think of the bottom of the organization as being routine and easily programmed and of the top as being creative and adaptive. However, in educational organizations, this notion in inverted - with programming at the top and adaptive approaches at the bottom.

P. DARO: I'd like to distinguish between loosely coupled units which are tightly organized internally, and loose coupling between programmed approaches at the top and adaptive approaches at the bottom, or vice versa.

J. SMITH: We have learned that where programs reach down to the teacher level, programs must be permitted to adapt anyway. Teachers or schools will "persist" to do what they think is best, regardless of external programming efforts.

P. BERMAN: Yes, but it may make a difference if that accommodation arises by necessity or by design. If you use an inappropriate implementation procedure at the macro-level you may amplify the very problems you are trying to avoid. Generically, the instructional core of schools is loosely coupled. But school districts vary in the degree of their "integration" of loose coupling.

A New Perspective on National Planning for School Improvement Programs: The Configurational Perspective and Goal-Free Planning

By David Clark, School of Education, Indiana University

The Context of National Planning for School Improvement Programs. In Table 1 (page 39) I have outlined in the left hand column a set of requisite conditions for systems-oriented, goal-based planning. I will argue that if this set of conditions is not in existence, then goal-based planning is not indicated. Perhaps the key issue is the degree of necessity of these conditions. On the right hand side I have identified the likely conditions in the national configuration of educational agencies.

The first requisite condition is that there be concurrence in and understanding of desired end states and means. But we find that multiple perspectives exist in education. Agencies are competitors. Even in inter-organizational and intraorganizational activity, there is competition. Moreover, school improvement activity is always a subordinate activity to other central activities, for example, in colleges or universities or local education agencies, it is obviously subordinate to teaching. Subordinate functions such as R&D or KPU (knowledge production and utilization) must vie with each other for support and will always lose out to central activity priorities.

The second requisite condition is that there be adequate empirical data on the resources and potential productivity of participating agents and agencies. But these data are currently incomplete. We do have a few sources of information, but they fall far short of providing the data which are needed to assess realistically the current or potential resources and production of many types of persons and agencies that are concerned with school improvement.

Third, there must be evaluative data on the competitive plans. This evidence, if available at all, is soft. We are frequently confronted only

TABLE 1

CONTEXT OF NATIONAL PLANNING FOR SCHOOL IMPROVEMENT PROGRAMS

Requisite Conditions for Systems-Oriented, Goal-Based Planning	Likely Conditions in the National Configuration of Educational Agencies
1. Concurrence in and understanding of desired end states and interventions (means) to achieve those ends.	1. Multiple perspectives on end states and means caused by: a. Varying intra-organizational goals and objectives in knowledge utilization (KU) or school improvement b. Varying (frequently competitive) intra-organizational activities, programs, and roles in KU. c. Subordinate status of KU activities within the constituent organizations.
2. Empirical data on the resources and potential productivity of participating agents & agencies.	2. Incomplete but improving data base, e.g., NIE Fact Book, Registry of Research Organizations in Education, etc.
3. Evaluative data on competitive plans.	3. Incomplete data from evaluations conducted in education, e.g., NDN, RDU, SCBP projects. Strong logical assertions by contending advocates. Analog data on alternatives from other fields, e.g., agriculture, medicine.
4. Requisite technical and instrumental knowledge about program implementation.	4. Emerging technology; unpredictable outcomes; inability to assert the "right" technology.
5. Predictive certainty about internal and external impact factors which might affect the program.	5. Crude futures studies technology. Incomplete knowledge of external impact factors and bad track record of predictions about known factors. Growing literature about contextual factors. Increased interest in newer organizational perspectives.
6. Inter-organizational linkages characteristic of an operating system, i.e., definable hierarchial relationships; structured roles in KU or school improvement programs; regularized interactions.	6. No binding authority relationship across institutions--no sanctions; no hierarchy; no fuctional flow of responsibilities or even regularized communication among agencies; negotiated, ad hoc agency relationships.

with analog data on alternatives in other fields. How are we to handle strong logical assertions which have no comparative alternatives, e.g., asserting the need for linking agents?

Fourth, there must be appropriate technical and instrumental knowledge about program implementation. But much of school improvement seems to depend on uncertain, and emerging "social" technology; improvement-oriented outcomes are often quite unpredictable; and we are often unable to identify the right approach, except after the fact.

Fifth, there must be predictive certainty about both internal and external impact factors that might affect the program. But futures studies in education have a bad track record. The growing literature about contextual factors leaves us with little sense of certainty about our ability to identify, much less assess, the future effect of program impact factors.

Sixth, a system-oriented plan assumes the existence of definable hierarchical relationships, structured roles, and regularized interactions among participating units. But these are no clear interorganizational linkages in education. There are no binding authority relationships across institutions, no sanctions, no hierarchy, no functional flow of responsibilities nor even regularized communication regarding knowledge utilization or school improvement efforts. Usually, we find only negotiated, ad hoc relationships.

I see no need to argue these points. The challenge to systems-oriented, goal-based planning depicted in Table 1 is not new. Its been around for 15 years (Cyert and March, 1963). Yet over these same 15 years, we've seen a concurrent acceleration of rationalistic innovations in education (e.g., PPBS, MIS, MBO, accountability systems, competency-based and performance-based education. If we look at many federal programs, there is the notion of "system" for school improvement, for example, PIPs (Project Information

Packages), Career Education Models, Right-to-Read. In all these examples you see the flow of rational programming. Many federal planners are still convinced that JDRP (Joint Dissemination Review Panel) and NDN (National Diffusion Network) are certain ways to go about dissemination. The "alternative" perspectives we have been discussing at this workshop have had little impact on national planning. This leads to an uncomfortable question - Why does the rationistic notion persist? Those of us who are interested in these new perspectives are a small group at least in the field of education. We're talking to ourselves. Why? The ideas we are discussing aren't new. There must be good reasons why people don't want to hear what we are saying. It must be more than mere resistance to change. What are the reasons for the popularity of rationalistic solutions? I believe that there may be two fundamental reasons. One reason is that the methodology for the alternatives is unspecified. For the person who says "Tell me what to do," if the conditions are not appropriate for programmed implementation, what can we say? Our configurational perspectives and adaptive approaches may be useful for analysis, but they haven't been developed far enough to be considered as reliable heuristics for specific planning problems.

I believe that the other major reason for the persistence of rationalistic approaches is simply that we are deeply and thoroughly acculturated to rational solutions. In the modern Western culture there is an overwhelming orientation toward rationality. Politically it is disastrous to have an organization that doesn't reach stated goals. Organizations must at least appear to solve problems, not just move problems from one spot to another.

Beyond these two fundamental reasons--absence of satisfactory alternative technologies and cultural norms of rationality--there is a methodological problem: What is an appropriate technology of foolishness? Let me approach this question indirectly with two illustrations. First, I have just come from an experience with another educational R&D agency where I was helping their senior staff to develop an institutional plan. On the first day, I tried to get them to enumerate problems associated with their previous agency planning efforts. There were plenty of problems. It was apparent to all that their previous planning efforts had been relatively unsuccessful. Then I tried to introduce some of the concepts of needs-oriented, capacity-based planning. They listened patiently and there was much discussion, all afternoon. The following morning, they got right down to outlining the format for their plan: mission, goals, objectives, strategies, and goal-based evaluation. My ideas were interesting, but I hadn't been able to provide them with an actionable, reliable, and trustworthy alternative. They couldn't escape from the systems-oriented, goal-based planning concepts and methods that they had used for so many years.

My second illustration, is from Sproull, Weiner and Wolf's (1978) Organizing an Anarchy. In their concluding section, they did an excellent job of supporting the rather startling conclusion that,

> "...The planning, even though performed by able analysts, was of little use once The Institute began to accumulate experience. Indeed, we have suggested that the commitment to planning was itself the cause of significant mischief."
> (Op. cit., p. 221)

However, when they turned to the question of offering alternatives to managers in new agencies, their seven suggestions emphasized not technologies but understandings, e.g., recognize the political terms of the agency's

creation--don't overestimate the support of the creators. At a "do it this way" level, they suggested 1) exercising creativity in defining rules for winning and losing, and 2) developing a list of "what we can be proud of." That simple strikes me an an inadequate alternative technology to offer the administrator who has abandoned, or is attempting to abandon, a well-designed, rational planning system.

Goal-Free Planning: An Alternative to Systems-Oriented, Goal-Based Planning. National level planning could aim at reconstructing the entire area of school improvement, but this is totally unrealistic. In Table 2, I have outlined what I believe is realistic. On the left of this table you will find the same set of likely conditions (in abbreviated form) that were presented in Table 1. On the right are found listings of objectives and suggested strategies/tactics of achieving these objectives, corresponding to each likely conditions.

This table is largely self-explanatory, so I won't try to repeat all its contents. It may be most appropriate to hear your comments and questions regarding Table 2.

Discussion and Commentary on the Clark Presentation

K. WEICK: In Table 2, you use the heading "strategies/tactics." The content seems heavy on tactics and light on strategies.

D. CLARK: I'll accept that point. You're right.

P. HOOD: Strategies may be considered as different combinations of the tactics outlined.

W. MASON: In 3b, you mention planned variations. Isn't this an incongruity with the idea of goal-free planning.

D. CLARK: I would like to adapt or adopt any element of goal-based planning that I thought I could use. I think some variations are so obvious they can and should be identified a priori. However, there should be sufficient flexibility in the program design to allow variations to be added as the program is in operation.

TABLE 2

GOAL-FREE PLANNING: AN ALTERNATIVE TO SYSTEMS-ORIENTED, GOAL-BASED PLANNING

Likely Condition	Needs-Oriented, Capacity Based Planning
1. Multiple perspectives on end states and means.	1.a) Objective: To design a plan to fit the commitments and operating strengths of the participating agents and agencies. To maximize their effective participation in D&U activities. b) Strategies/Tactics: 1) inventory institutional commitments to D&U; 2) examine their current involvement; 3) assess their potential for increased involvement; 4) negotiate whatever realistic and sustaining consensus is possible within and across agencies; 5) reduce insofar as possible the means-bound competition.
2. Incomplete data on resources and productivity.	2.a) Objective: To reduce the impact of a priori agency census data on the effectiveness of agency participation in the plan. b) Strategies/Tactics: 1) shorten the planning time frame; 2) gather formative evaluation data on agency participation in the plan, i.e., evaluation of the plan's effect on the capacity of the agency in D&U.
3. Incomplete data on competitive plans.	3.a) Objective: To avoid premature closure on D&U plans which exclude alternatives. To use national planning as a vehicle to explore operational variations. b) Strategies/Tactics: 1) initiate planned variations of D&U strategies and tactics; 2) examine current and future D&U ventures employing goal-free evaluation tactics; 3) encourage divergent, competitive, novel approaches to D&U in education.

Continued

Table 2 - Continued

Likely Condition	Needs-Oriented, Capacity-Based Planning
4. Emerging technology; unpredictable outcomes.	4.a) Objective: To avoid stifling experimental efforts in educational D&U by imposing short range product evaluation requirements, rigid process definitions, and specified outcomes. 4.b) Strategies/Tactics: 1) allow talented grantees to "...operate on the basis of trial and error procedure...pragmatic inventions of necessity;"* 2) emphasize formative rather than summative evaluation; 3) assume that support of practitioners in emerging areas of technology is appropriately judged as an investment in inquiry.
5. Predictive uncertainty regarding external and internal impact factors.	5.a) Objective: To achieve predictive realism in planning; specifically, to attune the planning process to the crudity of futures studies technology. b) Strategies/Tactics: 1) shorten the planning time frame; 2) design iterative cycles of replanning which assume that documentation of practice will yield data appropriate for continuing short time frame plans of increasing sophistication.
6. Configurational rather than systems perspective of educational KU organizations.	6.a) Objective: To achieve structural realism in planning; specifically, to attune the planning process to the character of the educational KU community. b) Strategies/Tactics: 1) utilize organizational perspectives for planning appropriate to the educational KU community, e.g., loosely coupled units, organized anarchies; 2) base planning on a configurational view of agency relationships in education, e.g., temporary interactions, co-equal status, overlapping roles, etc.

* Cohen, March, and Olsen, ASQ March, 1972.

P. BERMAN: I'm vaguely uneasy. You can call this goal-free planning. I'm not clear that it is or ought to be goal-free, but maybe I think of goals in a different way.

D. CLARK: Goal-free is an uncomfortable term. It carries the connotations of aimlessness. As I've noted in an earlier paper (Clark, 1977) I've based the idea on Scriven's rationale for goal-free evaluation (GFE).

B. BANATHY: How about "evolutionary planning" as a term.

D. CLARK: I find that the label "goal-free" challenges people to react, it stimulates discussion. It's not that goals per se are inappropriate or disallowed. But the notion is to free the planning process from the domination of goals. More conventional planning has been goal dominated; i.e., the need to specify your goals first, then assume all else follows directly from these goals. Goal-free planning not only frees the planner from this tyranny of goals, but also from the sequential role goals play in the planning process, i.e., goals are discovered, they may evolve by retrospection following exploratory action. Note, that if goals are prospective, then they must arise from an assessment of needs and capabilities. But Table 1 reminds us that we simply don't have adequate information to assess needs and capabilities except at the crudest levels. Goals are surely admissible, but I think I can get more people to argue with me if I use the term Goal-Free Planning.

P. BERMAN: I recall Karl Weick's idea that there are tightly coupled oases; there is a role for ideology. Some goals are needed in order to focus on development of a common ideology at policy levels, to differentiate the policy from other interests, and to provide general directions for action. Leadership can set purposes and create a consensus where none exists. However, the minute you get to specifics, there's conflict. Leaders deliberately set goals and leave the rest ambiguous. Goals in that sense are needed. It's the attempt to proceed directly from goals to objectives and then to strategies that seems to be the idea you are challenging here.

D. CLARK: That's a good point. I now must distinguish between goals as giving some common sense of purpose and general direction, and goals that are directly linked to objectives and the development of detailed, preordained plans of action.

J. HEMPHILL: Must goal-free be singular, can there not be goals to allow for multiple perspectives? Can't one consider the possibility of proceeding on the basis that there may be multiple problems rather than a common problem?

J. SMITH: It seems that goal-free planning is a description of what is happening here in California. The approach we are taking in the State Department of Education with the School Improvement Program is to communicate a very general idea of the purposes of the program, to be very specific about the processes that schools must follow to secure and maintain funding, but to be highly permissive about the content of the programs. We even provide a year, with funding, for the school site planning process before implementation of a school improvement program. Our Planning Handbook (CSDE, 1978) even provides three options. The first option is a linear

problem solving process, the second option permits the sequence to be determined by the school community, the third is a "U-Do-It" option that permits great latitude as long as the process allows the school to meet minimum requirements. So at the school level, we provide options that can range from a highly linear sequence of needs assessment, objectives specification, solution development, etc., to options that have great flexibility. At the State Department level we know our ideas are evolving. Some are based on more than ten years of experience with previous programs, so we are working with a lot of experience about what you can and can't do at a state level if you are really serious about encouraging and helping local schools to improve their own programs. We've learned that you have got to be adaptive to the realities of local schools and communities. Schools must have some latitude to interpret how best to use School Improvement funds.

D. CLARK: That points to John Hemphill's remark about multiple problems and multiple goals. I happen to think that row #3 (Table 2) speaks to the need to provide competitive options and alternatives. There's no reason to choose one or another as the "winner" until we look more carefully at the planning process. Any planning or management effort can be done well or badly. There are in fact different ways to approach planning.

J. HEMPHILL: Multiple problems and goals as options to choose among is one idea. I would also like to distinguish between common problems and mutual problems. In the common problem situation every one shares some common ideas about what is the problem they all face. In the mutual problem situation, people can even be in adversarial positions. They may have very different interpretations of the problem and of desired outcomes. This is apparent when we think of a game of chess or bridge, but it is also true of many social situations. People need to learn how to interact in mutual problem situations, but they don't need to share the same objectives or behave in the same way. But they need to interact.

D. CLARK: Yes, but if you go in that direction, you would be breaking from convention; usually one strives for consensus.

P. DARO: Goals are not a good place to start. This is a rational fiction, like research starts with hypotheses. There's always the assumption that there is a very large body of prior knowledge and experience. When that knowledge and experience exists and is relevant and sufficient, goals (in action efforts) or hypotheses (in research) may be appropriate. But when our experience and knowledge aren't adequate we'd better be exploratory and experimental.

M. SCRIVEN: Well, having given impetus to this concept of goal-free, I'd like to suggest that we interpret it from the point of view that "free from the tyranny of" is a good place to start. Goals may be OK for developing a general sense of direction, but not as a sure guide for planning, action, or evaluation.

Newer Perspectives in the Evaluation of School Improvement Programs: Goal-Free Evaluation; School Improvement Profile

By Michael Scriven, Evaluation Institute, University of San Francisco.

Goal-Free Evaluation (GFE). Let me begin with the strands that produced GFE. As we were observing earlier, my intention was to free evaluators from the tyranny of goals. What is the nature of this tyranny?

1. Preordinate evaluation design is a barrier to improvement. Evaluators have learned that they must establish "base-line control," but the base-line measures are often narrow. Consequently the measures of improvement are often narrow. The GFE baseline is very broad.

2. There are practical problems of identifying goals, namely:

   a. There may be conflicting goals--which ones to use?

   b. Goals may shift over time. The goals that were established at the beginning of the project are often substantially modified as the project progresses. Which version do you use?

   c. Sheer numbers are sometimes a problem. Complex social programs may have multiple goals. Measured objectives associated with these goals can be numerous indeed.

   d. If goals aren't clear, then the goal-based evaluator must infer them from behavior, but this can be tautological. (Did they do what they did?)

3. Goals may be irrelevant because of over/under achievement. If you view reaching goals as being meritorious, then shortfalls are bad, but goals may be set very high to inspire people. On the other hand, it's crazy to reinforce people who set very low goals and reach them. Goals are irrelevant in summative evaluation, because the question is--has the project reached the needs of the clientele?

4. Goals don't take side effects into consideration. Projects can produce both positive and negative side effects that may not be related in any way to the stated goals. If you only look for goal attainment you may not pay any attention to side effects. Note also, if you take goals

seriously, you need to evaluate the goals themselves, i.e., Were they the right goals? Were they comprehensive?

5. Goal-based evaluation (GBE) is inconsistent with the purposes of product evalution, which should be to match the consumer (client) needs with product performance.

6. Management-orientation vs. consumerism. This point is related to the previous one. GBE is management oriented, GFE is consumer oriented.

7. GFE provides superior bias-control. There is usually social interaction between the evaluator and project staff relating to project goals. Knowledge of these goals will affect the final analysis. Being told about goals sets your eyes in that direction. GFE can avoid bias. For GFE the questions are: What's happening? Are client's needs being served? Not, were the project's goals attained? GFE is exactly "double-blind" methodology in evaluation.

8. GFE is more sensitive to side effects. If you don't know what was intended, you really have to look.

9. GFE is reversible. You can run a GFE and then run a GBE; but you can't go in the other sequence. So it's OK to look at goals, but only after GFE.

10. GFE should have higher credibility. If meritorious performance was found without looking for it directly, that's impressive.

11. Finally, because goal-free evaluation is bottom-line oriented, it may have a political plus.

Questions and Comments on GFE

Q: Would you elaborate on your third point?

M. SCRIVEN: Goal-based evaluation reinforces those who set goals low, and that is nutty. If you've got to have goals, then the goal levels should be

evaluated against the needs of clientele. But why bother when you can go directly to the needs of clientele and ignore goals?

Q: What about side effects?

M. SCRIVEN: You must have a good grasp of the full range of client needs to evaluate the side effects. Note that in GFE you really aren't concerned with distinguishing intended effects from side effects. What you are concerned with is all of the effects.

Q: In point six, you said GBE is management oriented, what about GFE?

M. SCRIVEN: GBE does serve management, but GFE can also tell management something. How much depends on the fit of management goals to client needs.

Q: I see a relation between preordinate MBO and preordinate evaluation design.

M. SCRIVEN: Written goals and objectives can be barriers to creative management and to creative evaluation. Neither encourages serendipitous results.

School Evaluation Profile. In this part of my presentation I'm going to discuss our work in developing the School Evaluation Profile. This is an example of "responsibility evaluation" as contrasted to casual analysis.

1. In responsibility evaluation you start by asking: If we ignore all the variance of all factors over which there is no manipulable control, is there enough variance left to be worth fooling around with? You identify the factors over which there is no control and ignore them.

2. For whatever remains, can we identify the actor(s) who have control over these factors?

3. Third, can we get measure of these factors?

4. Then, can these measures be obtained cheaply? As we all know schools are pressed for funds. The economy issue is important.

5. Finally, will the measures be interpretable? We must avoid using measures or indicators that are so complex or esoteric that they are not comprehensible by school personnel.

In the School Evaluation Profile we followed these steps to develop a number of components. Each component is comprised of a cluster of measures

which are related to factors over which someone in the school has control. I'll only briefly outline the content areas of the profile, since in this presentation we are more concerned with how the profile's results are used, than how the profile is constructed or how data are collected.

1. School Management. The profile has two school management-related clusters. One looks at the management information system (MIS) and the other at management performance. In the MIS cluster we are interested in what information is available to the principal regarding school laws, clientele, etc. What knowledge does the principal have of useful information models; does the principal have a repertoire of "fixes" for common or critical information acquisition problems; what does the principal know about teacher evaluation, etc.? The management performance cluster distinguishes know-how from action. It looks at performance indicators.

2. Teachers. There are two clusters of variables here. One is concerned with teacher qualifications, such as training. The second is concerned with various teacher commitment indicators, e.g., patterns of sick leave, inservice effort.

3. Teacher Aides and Classified Staff. We look primarily at commitment indicators.

4. Students. The measures in this area deal largely with commitment, e.g., truancy, vandalism.

5. Justice. This is a complex of indicators that reflect interaction among management, the instructional staff, students, etc.

6. District Support.

7. Community Support.

Associated with each of the above accountability areas, is a long list of questions; with a deliberate design to provide triangulation. The profile

provides a useful form of "process evaluation." The set of scales we are using seem to be comprehensive. I've treated the actual content of the profile only briefly, in order to provide time to discuss its use in a school improvement program. The generic problem in school improvement is that it is very complex. Schools are often involved simultaneously in a variety of projects. The profile provides a bird's eye view of what's happening in terms of things someone is responsible for and actually can control. The problem for school people is that if there are multiple strategies which may work, which do they pick? When should they switch? My view is that it is better to go for a single, elastic approach.

SPATE. My advice is to use Soft Planning and Tough Evaluation (SPATE). Soft planning doesn't have to be toothless. You can adjust the degree of specificity and clarity of the plan depending on what you know at the time. You may well need to change the plan. Needs of clients may have changed. Technology may have changed. Some of the characteristics of soft planning are:

1. Goals are general.
2. Goals are frequently reconsidered.
3. Objectives are only useful when they are required by law. Objectives are loosely targeted and reconsidered very often.
4. The specificity of goals and objectives is determined by needs and context.
5. In the initial phase, planning is often tied to enabling legislation. Managers must push at the limits, established in legislation, which constrain the program.
6. The program will be modified if there is good reason or justification. Successive cycles of planning aim at convergence.

In soft planning, you don't need a "roving evaluator" as much as you need a "roving adapter."

Now what is "tough evaluation" in this context? It implies use of responsibility accountability that is tougher. Whatever effects you produce, you are responsible for, and that's what you are evaluated on: 1) determination of clients' needs; 2) direct and side effects; 3) updating needs assessments; 4) program modifications, etc. The School Improvement Profile is an available instrument for accomplishing this kind of tough evaluation.

Reactions and Discussion of Scriven's Presentation

B. MONTY: How does the GFE go back to needs assessment?

M. SCRIVEN: By identifying the effect produced and then relating these effects produced to the needs addressed.

P. DARO: I see a tradeoff between GBE and GFE; you tend to get depth in the former and breadth in the latter. GFE may provide more consumer based information, but we also need depth of information about consumer needs and their satisfaction.

J. HEMPHILL: Mike, it seems to me that this is like a shell game, and you have moved the "pea" from the "goals" shell to the "needs of the client" shell.

M. SCRIVEN: Nobody is guaranteeing needs assessment. It's tough work. But I see using client needs as a much more reliable basis for evaluation. Goals change; they may not be comprehensive; they may divert your attention from side effects.

S. SCHAINKER: Regarding the School Evaluation Profiles, when do you do needs assessment?

M. SCRIVEN: It depends, sometimes you can use some of the existing information schools have. You may want to verify it, and go beyond what they have written.

K. WEICK: What's the likelihood "tough" evaluation undercuts "soft" planning? In brainstorming we've learned to keep the idea generation phase entirely separate from the evaluation phase.

M. SCRIVEN: This may call for the distinction between formative and summative evaluation. Formative efforts can be supportive. But somewhere along the line there should be a tough evaluation.

J. HEMPHILL: How do you identify "clients?"

M. SCRIVEN: You look at the delivery system. You identify those most likely to be directly served, and then you look on down the line to try to identify those less directly served.

P. BERMAN: I like the approach, but there's a problem. Here's a scenario. It takes about a year to mobilize support and get an educational program organized. It takes a second year to stabilize operations. Maybe, in the third year, you have some hope of the program producing reliable outcomes. So my question is, what does the evaluator do in the first year?

M. SCRIVEN: You do process evaluation, then you switch later to product evaluation.

P. BERMAN: In process evaluation you look at a set of things, but these should be connected to some "theory of implementation" in order to provide the evaluator with some idea of what to look for and what to recommend.

M. SCRIVEN: In developing the School Evaluation Profile, we run on logic rather than theory. For instance we do look at communication, you've got to have that; but we may not look at power equalization, which implies a particular theory of change.

P. BERMAN: The Profile is atheoretical, but sensible. But it does, in fact, assume a type of causality. It assumes some weighing of indicators, and it assumes some validity of indicators. If we can wed this logical approach with a more sophisticated theory of implementation it should be possible to provide more useful process evaluation information. Then when the program is stabilized we can switch to product evaluation.

A. HUFF: As I understand the Profile, it requires a lot of time on the part of the evaluator to produce the information. Won't this work against widespread use by schools?

M. SCRIVEN: The instrument is already in a form that the average school administrator could learn to use. Schools may not have a lot of discretionary money to purchase outside services, but school administrators can barter their time to help each other.

W. MASON: What do you do about needs assessment when the clients may be ignorant of their needs?

M. SCRIVEN: Needs assessment is different from market research. We don't take the clients' "wants" at face value. Needs must be inferred. That's where the evaluators' skill and experience pays off.

P. BERMAN: I want to ask about the role of the evaluator in the process part of the work. Doesn't the evaluator interact with program staff; isn't there a bias? But can't this bias be used positively?

M. SCRIVEN: Evaluation can take "passive" or "active" stances.

P. BERMAN: OK. Suppose you use an active stance, for example, transactional evalution.

M. SCRIVEN: I wish you had selected another active model. Transactional evaluation often gets into the process solipsism problem. Is there any other evidence than good feelings?

P. BERMAN: Maybe there is a need for adaptive evaluation. Could there be a theory that said if you create state "X" in people's minds, this is the relevant objective or need in this situation.

M. SCRIVEN: There is a role conflict between the evaluator and the manager. Managers are already "evaluating" in their own way. They don't need more of the same kind of information. The evaluator can and should be more objective.

P. BERMAN: Why can't one switch? Learning how to implement a program well is the basic problem.

M. SCRIVEN: In the formative context, GFE provides a set of "new eyes" that can be helpful to managers. But the evaluator needs to maintain a degree of detached objectivity in order to provide a different view of reality.

P. DARO: GFE is more like what School Improvement staff have been saying. In the School Improvement Program there are no prespecified content requirements. GFE is a more sensible approach. The problem we should address is how to make the transition from GBE to GFE.

S. McKIBBIN: Part of our message to school people and to professional evaluators might be to say it is all right; it is a legitimate alternative. We need to legitimize looking at things in new ways.

L. JENKS: These perspectives, goal-free planning and goal-free evaluation, are largely descriptive of what is going on. They are also a blend of some new and some old ideas. So some may say what's new?

K. WEICK: But is that the way they act? I see a lot of people in schools very tied up with goals and objectives, and with very formal, rational approaches.

B. MONTY: I'm having a problem of going from GFE strategies to tactics.

S. SCHAINKER: I don't see a tremendous receptivity to these ideas. The school people I've been working with don't accept GFE.

L. JENKS: But if you don't use labels.

M. SCRIVEN: What's a Goal-Free Evaluator? Simply an independent observer, who is not concerned with what you intended to accomplish, but with what you have actually accomplished, and with how these accomplishments relate to current client needs.

General Discussion and Comment

P. HOOD: We have reserved this time for general discussion and comment on all the presentations.

P. DARO: I want to know more about what coupling means, perhaps it has different meanings.

W. MASON: If you look at these new perspectives from the federal policy level, the implications seem grim. The world may run as these perspectives imply, but how then do you formulate policy? At first it seems discouraging. However, realism doesn't mean simply reflecting the "real world," but modifying it. We must deal with the limits of improvement, moves then can be made.

P. BERMAN: There is an obligation to act. The question is, can you achieve your objectives better by knowing better how organizations operate? Decision making ought to take into account that organizations may operate in ways that are not consistent, say, with tight coupling. We are talking about a more enlightened way of designing policies. I don't want to do away with rationality The ultimate test will be if these new approaches work.

J. SMITH: Another value is that these perspectives give you another shot at intervention.

D. CLARK: OK, but I agree with Ward Mason. If change agentry should reflect the way the world is, I keep falling back, at least in part, on rationality. It seems to make sense to try to balance between old and new perspectives, rather than rejecting either out of hand. The notion of realism deals with the limits of improvement. Occasionally, just using what is currently available would result in substantial improvement. I view these perspectives as another planning tool, to add to those I already use, as a way to introduce realism in in change agentry. The major test of usefulness for me will be if I can actually apply these ideas. I've already recounted my experience working with another R&D agency. I'm going back to that agency next week, and have another try.

P. DARO: Would it help to distinguish two uses of these ideas: 1) applied to understanding and working in your own organization; and 2) the relevance of these ideas in dealing with other agencies?

A. HUFF: It may not be possible to provide the kind of leadership "improvement" Ward Mason would like in more decoupled, anacronistic situations. For example, conglomerate headquarters provide, in general, financial guidelines but do not have the expertise to handle substantive decision-making for the varied businesses under their ultimate control. These decisions are made within the various organizations. Leadership at the top manages only the <u>way</u> in which substantive decisions are made.

[END OF MONDAY, JULY 23rd SESSION]

TUESDAY, JULY 24th SESSION:

PANEL DISCUSSION OF PREVIOUS DAY'S PRESENTATIONS

Consensus Across the Perspectives

Carolyn S. Cates, Far West Laboratory
for Educational Research and Development

In much of my studies, I've been looking at the differences between these newer organizational perspectives and the more traditional views of organizations. Hence, I've tended to look for similarities among the ideas presented yesterday. There is a strong notion of tenuous relationships, looseness, inconsistencies, and unpredictability of relations--between agency levels (macro-micro); between the administrative and the technical core; between goals, actions, and results. There is also a greater sensitivity in these perspectives to the context of a particular situation. Moreover, characterizations are not all or none; there may be significant aspects of an organization that may be characterized as loosely coupled, or employing a garbage can decision process, but other parts of the organization may be tightly coupled and employ rational decision making. The result of employing these perspectives is a shift of internal context, and a shift of focus on what happens in organizations. Planning becomes more complex, as for example Paul Berman's point that there may be a need to mix, match, and switch strategies. There is a more pluralistic view of organizations. Finally, there is greater tolerance for incremental change processes.

Comments

P. BERMAN: From Dave Clark's and Mike Scriven's presentations, I was also struck by the similarities with my work. I have a basic disagreement with Scriven, but a great deal of what he says, not where he's coming from, I agree with. Karl Weick provides a backdrop. During our planning session Dave Clark presented a matrix that arrayed organizational levels across a kind of continuum ranging from basic ideas to operational intervention tools.

On that continuum, Karl Weick is at the basic research level, while I see the rest of us moving toward developing operational interventions. There are similarities in our propositions. Mike Scriven's notion of goal-free fits my notion of the kind of evaluation needed in adaptive planning situations.

A. HUFF: There is a continuum of belief in intervention certainty, that I can place the four presentations on:

(uncertain) Weick Clark Berman Scriven (certain)
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

P. DARO: That makes sense to me. Scriven belives that certainty must precede action.

A. LIEBERMAN: I think there is an even greater underlying difference between Scriven and the others. But until we get a live case it may be hard to see what the differences really are. We need to look at how these various ideas are actually applied.

K. WEICK: Scriven sees things as more fixed; I see them as more fluid.

B. MONTY: There is a fundamental disjuncture in the ways things are looked at. Before, it was enough to look at needs, goals, and then activities and measures that are derived from goals. Now we are saying that we should question or challenge how needs, activities, goals, etc., are derived and the roles they should play.

W. MASON: It seems that these new perspectives are compatible with modern critiques of social science knowledge. For example, in adaptive implementation, it's less important what the original innovation was, as what is its outcome.

P. DARO: These ideas change the character of how the system is organized to take input. If the system is hierarchical and tightly coupled, it can take input from the top. But if the system is loosely coupled, you take input from many places. Decision making is dispersed.

A. HUFF: The research ideas at the top may still be important, but how leaders proceed to implement these ideas will be different.

P. BERMAN: I'm stimulated by these remarks. One problem in research on knowledge utilization is the assumption that somehow the product can be taken out of context, without considering how the product operates in specific situations. There are of course technologically dominant situations, for example some machines will operate and be used in similar ways wherever they are located. But in more adaptive areas, there are interactions between the innovation and the context. We don't have enough knowledge about these areas. Research about the social innovation implementation process suggests that it is not what the innovation is, but how it is implemented that seems to make the big difference.

Let me explain the relation between specificity and outcomes. In a certain technology application you ought to be specific, perhaps even programmed, in your implementation approach, perhaps in installing IPI (Individually Programmed Instruction). On the other hand, uncertain technologies break down badly when they are implementated through programmed approaches. But when vague, complex technologies are implemented adaptively, and especially where goals are clarified over time, then they worked. Note there is a contingent condition; you need goal clarification.

A. LIEBERMAN: I was a teacher. Now I teach teachers. No teacher follows an innovation with fidelity in mind. You do things that work. Teaching is inherently like Karl Weick describes. It's fluid.

P. BERMAN: But the fidelity--adaptation problem is a dilemma for evaluators. In biology we have the idea of mutations, when does a mutation become a new species? At some point, when schools adapt an innovation, it becomes a new thing. It may be better to think of fidelity as one end of a continuum.

W. MASON: Perhaps, but there seems to be two variations when we are considering the modified use of an innovation: 1) it has been adopted in a form that is true to the original idea, but tailored so that idea can better fit the specific situation; and 2) it has been so modified that it departs significantly from the original.

P. BERMAN: I distinguish the "policy image" from an operational program. The policy image is often deliberately vague. This is a good tactic for getting otherwise controversial legislation passed. When you translate an image into a "thing" it takes on goals.

K. WEICK: Yes, as people clarify images, some may bail out.

P. DARO: We have an image of what we want to happen to students, and there is an analogous statement that must be made about what adults should do. But only one of many possible ways to implement a program is selected. Sometimes there is an image shift. A lot of our current images are negative. For instance, environmentalists get a lot of mileage by envisoning things getting worse.

B. BANATHY: We must distinguish between the image of policy intent and the image of the solution. Policy makers often try not to deal with the details of solutions.

Issues and Problems Raised by the Presentations

Anne Huff, Institute for Social Science Research, UCLA

1. Politics. There is a political nature of school organizations implied in the concept of anarchies, but not covered explicitly in our discussion thus far. Within organizations there are individuals and groups of individuals that may have different, sometimes conflicting purposes.

Fundamentally, politics is concerned with the bargaining process, with how power and resources are allocated. Ideology may be important, since it helps to define or give meaning in complex, ambiguous situations.

2. Mix and Switch. Paul Berman raised hard questions in asking how to mix and when to switch strategies. Here are some ideas that we've discussed or might discuss:

a. There may be hierarchical ways to mix and match. There may be different modes that are appropriate at different levels, e.g., the approach may be more programmed at the top, but adaptive at the delivery level.

b. Look at structure. Maybe some people should be doing different things. Part of an organization may be able to rely on fairly certain technology where programmed approaches may work, while other parts of the organization may confront great uncertainty and have to rely more on adaptive approaches.

c. The audience may be important. There may be a need to "absorb uncertainty" in dealing with the public or outsiders. The more programmed aspects of an innovation may be the easiest to communicate to others who are less aware of the complexities of a situation.

d. Personality and personal styles are undoubtedly factors. Are the key people more planners or muddlers? You may want to choose people whose styles are compatible with the situation and the approach.

e. Temporal Aspects. There may be issues of timing and phasing. What do people have energy to do? New efforts or redirections in effort need to be timed with a view to available resources and energy. Phasing is also important. Burton Clark has observed that many organizations go through alterations between executives who are "vision makers" and "housekeepers." Organizations may be able to realize gains from past adaptive experiences by switching to a programmed mode, for example.

f. Renewal. Organizations change over time. You can adapt or evolve away from something which may need to be brought back.

3. Learning. You know what you did after you did it. James March's point about interpreting past decision and actions in the light to the experience of today is a good one. What about people who have made heavy

investments in programmed approaches to planning and evaluation? They may not be able to make the shift. Perhaps, also, the converse may hold. Those with extensive adaptive experience may find it hard to switch to a programmed mode, or a goal-oriented mode, even when this is a useful approach.

4. Fit and Congruence. At the systems level, the issue of fit may be mainly concentrated on how the program or organization will fit within the larger social/environmental system, how well the program or idea meshes with external conditions. Internal to the system is the problem of congruence of many different elements. Can you initiate goal-free planning in an organization where the other aspects of the organization, e.g., rewards, are attached to goal-based, structured perspectives?

5. Ecology. What level of the system are we responding to with goal-free planning: adaptive implementation and/or goal-free evaluation? Planned adaptiveness to symptoms at one level may not work on others. Several years ago Sears made a significant variation in their merchandising strategy in response to demographic trends which showed their traditional customer base was eroding. But Sears failed to take into sufficient account what their immediate competitors were doing in and their response to legitimate long term trends, negatively affected their immediate market share. Long term adaptation may suggest a different form of activity than the needs of the moment, which considerably complicate our decisions to use these new approaches.

6. Translation/Diffusion. Bob Tannenbaum has looked at the literature on death and dying. He found that there are several rather well-defined stages people go through: initial denial, then anger, then sorrow, and finally acceptance. Why have so many fundamental changes failed? It may be because we don't allow enough time for people to proceed at a natural

pace through stages of denial, anger (resistance), and grief in order to reach acceptance. Some of my own work on change has been concerned with looking at the role of argument. What is the dialectical process by which opposing views are developed and revised?

Finally, Paul Hood's paper referred to March's idea of a technology of foolishness. We haven't dealt with having fun. We need more sense of play and foolishness in what we've done.

Discussion

J. SMITH: I have a comment about the temporal aspects of mixing and switching. If you are an external organization working with schools, and you switch your strategies, you may find yourself dealing with different communication problems. For instance, in some technical content areas, such as finance, there will usually be a "gate keeper" with a vested interest in keeping communications into the organization in that area less open, i.e., channeled through him/her. There is often a lot of specialization in some instructional areas, e.g., special education or compensatory education. However in other areas, it's not specialized--everyone or no one may be interested. Programmed approaches may work better when the information channels are well defined and fairly simple. The problem for adaptive approaches is knowing how to proceed, usually it also means reaching a lot of different people with considerable redundancy because there may be no reliable communication channels. The problem with switching strategies is that these communication differences may not be considered in disseminating information to schools.

P. DARO: If you think of organizations as in a chain, and the relations between units as tight or loose, and of some using programmed or adaptive linkages between units, then you quickly have a highly complex idea. The whole classical idea of bureaucracies is that they are fundamentally hierarchical and tightly coupled. Their aim was to replace the capricious functionary with a specialist who would follow well defined rules and regulations. In organized anarchies there is a reversed concept. The capricious functionary is the product of a loosely coupled system. In an external organization, such as a department of education or an intermediate unit, each unit deals with "their world." After the initial "programming," these units can disengage from a) other parts of the agency and b) from the outside world. At the local educational agency (LEA), the various units within the LEA experience different styles within and across agencies.

J. SMITH: The overall view probably has to be complicated if it is to be accurate. But I think there is a natural tendency to reduce uncertainty. It's just that different organizations and different people have different styles for doing this. Some can tolerate greater ambiquity than others.

L. JENKS: I think of the difference between the rigid, formalistic classroom as opposed to the open classroom. These are very different instructional situations that have been studied. Here are some general findings. For one thing, flexibility in classrooms seems to require more talent. For another, the instructional information system must be more decision-oriented than maintenance-oriented. However, in the open classroom there is also potential for great waste.

P. DARO: There may have to be a meta-program. Those things that are programmed tend to get crystallized. The programmable parts tend to dominate the more fluid parts. Unless the meta-program recognizes and counters this tendency, there isn't the time or the tolerance for the fluid parts to work out adaptively how they should function.

A. LIEBERMAN: If you say to people, we want you to be adaptive, and there is very little technology, talent, or specific experience, then people look to structure.

S. SCHAINKER: If, in education, most of the technology is uncertain then the argument is that you should be adaptive. But people are prone to reduce uncertainty.

A. LIEBERMAN: You can teach people to deal with uncertainties, dilemmas, and conflicts. Let me recount a personal experience. I was a linker in a school where the principal was changed during the course of our project. The first principal was a good "getter." He tried to open the playground as a way of getting teachers to work together. Over three years he slowly got teachers to work together. He didn't know much about technique, but by trial and error he made a lot of progress. He had a personal tragedy and left the school. Perhaps because the teachers had come to recognize how important a role he had played in the school, they insisted on interviewing the candidates for his replacement. However the person they picked had a fundamentally different style. In six months the new principal had created a traditional environment that killed the whole project. All the teachers were back in their classrooms, working alone. There was no longer a group with which we could work.

P. HOOD: [To P. Berman] Does this case suggest the need to add a "capacity" parameter to your list of situational parameters?

P. BERMAN: Maybe it makes sense to separate the strategy you use from the issue of how implementable the strategy is. In some situations no change strategy may be very effective.

P. HOOD: I recall Mike Scriven's point about reversibility/irreversibility between GFE and GBE. Maybe adjustments of tactics for client capacity can be made by linking agents or deliverers, but only if the dissemination program's structure is inherently adaptive. Preconceived ideas of what change agents are supposed to do may get in the way. We can train, socialize, and evaluate them in ways that inhibit their responding adaptively to client situations.

P. DARO: We program some aspects of the California School Improvement Program, e.g., the composition of a school advisory council, the budget, etc. In some districts they have violated the rules, for example, used the budget for other purposes. There has to be some programming to get to a place where there is room and resources for looseness.

L. JENKS: For the past several years we've been working with a large number of school districts that are interested in or considering adopting EBCE, our Experience-Based Career Education model. Those that get to the point of serious consideration almost invariably look not only at the program but also how they propose to carry out the implementation. We've learned that if you are to introduce a complex educational program, you've got to find ways for people to mesh the substance of the program with their own strategy for implementation.

P. DARO: In reality, you will find that there are no pure forms of replication of any complex educational practice; however, in most cases, we don't pay as much attention to implementation strategy as we do to the program substance.

P. BERMAN: My problem with the California School Improvement Program is that it is almost purely school-based. The relation of the school-level activity to the district or outside agencies is evolving, and not yet at all well defined.

I'd like to go back to Anne Huff's list. I like it. Her point about politics is important. My own background is in political science. Perhaps because I am so close to these political ideas, I don't make more of a point of them. I think these new perspectives are inherently political. We can tolerate loose coupling in schools, because it rests on authority. The whole notion of adaptive implementation is to agree on the general rules of the game so bargaining can take place. Many of the people in schools are used to thinking about "politics" in the gutsy sense that we are talking about. But we haven't done a thorough job of communication.

A HUFF: In organizational theory there is an often limited view of politics. There are other approaches, e.g., partisan politics model, representational model. When we say it is political, we mean there are various interests of different stakeholders that must be considered.

A. LIEBERMAN: I have an example of how a programmed approach was distorted by politics. I was an advisor for a graduate student whose dissertation was a study of the implementation of DISTAR in a large school district. DISTAR is a highly programmed approach. There was a perfect research design, even with randomization between DISTAR and control schools. But at the end of the study there was no difference between the DISTAR and the control groups. I asked the student to tell me more about what happened during the course of the implementation. It turned out that at the same time there was a power battle between teacher unions as to who was going to represent the teachers. One faction happened to seize on a whole series of programs that it labeled demeaning to the teaching profession. DISTAR was one of the programs. In the schools whose teachers were favorable to that faction,

DISTAR had low success. However, in schools whose teachers predominantly favored the other faction, DISTAR was highly successful.

P. BERMAN: We need to look at and work on the conflict, not try to program it away.

Evaluation and Adaptive Implementation
Paul Berman.

In this session, I'd like to reflect aloud about the role of evaluation in adaptive implementation. I've been thinking since yesterday about Mike Scriven's approach. Part of my interest is because I've been writing an article about this subject. Mike may be aware of, but he does not represent, the field of evaluation. There are a number of new evaluation paradigms that appear to be more congenial to an adaptive approach, e.g., Rippey's transactional evaluation, House's responsive evaluation. When I look at the literature on evaluation, I think they made an error in contrasting the new with the old. I think that some of the old models were developed when evaluators didn't really understand how the world works, at least in complex social program situations. But the newer evaluation models are still having a problem in defining the role that evaluation information could or should play in social program implementation. I'm hoping to ground evaluation in a theory of implementation, or to treat evaluation as part of the implementation strategy.

I want to refer back to my presentation yesterday where I considered the diagnosis and prescription for the two approaches. I now want to add a fourth element in both of those figures (Figures 2.1 and 2.2 amended).

FIGURE 2.1 (amended)

PROGRAMMED APPROACH

Diagnosis	Prescription
1. - 3. (same)	1. - 3. (same)
4. Traditional methods are not used or not possible, information is unreliable.	4. Go to GFE approach, deal with outcomes, or insist that reliable methods be used.
No use of evaluation	Employ planned, controlled variations and evaluate them better.
	Make evaluation decision-oriented

In the programmed approach most of the literature is goal-based. Poor management or unreliable technology are seen as the causes for failure. If information is unreliable, neither management nor technology can be improved much. The complaint is often that evaluation isn't done, or that if it is done, it's ignored. The prescription is to clarify goals, manage better, make technology more reliable, and use goal-free evaluation methods that look at a wider range of effects.

FIGURE 2.2 (amended)

ADAPTIVE APPROACH

Diagnosis	Prescription
1. - 3. (same)	1. - 3. (same)
4. Traditional evaluation is inappropriate; process needs to be examined.	4. Use active evaluation (evaluator participates in implementation process, so necessarily introduces but takes advantage of bias. Context, process, emerging sense of goals and accomplishments are all attended to.

In the adaptive approach one must recognize that there is high interaction between the intervention and the context. Hence it no longer makes sense to evaluate the effect of the intervention alone. The evaluation role must be active, especially if it is to attend to changes in process and the dynamic interaction between the intervention and the social context. If the evaluator participates, the evaluator's bias will be introduced, but the evaluator can take advantage of the bias. I think social science has long gotten over the idea of being value-free. The important thing is to know and communicate the nature of the evalutator's bias. As I've noted earlier, it seems important for people to be able to discover and clarify their goals over time. This is an important area where the evaluator can assist. This is not so much an information-providing role as a values clarification and interpretation role.

Let's go back to simplified scenario that involves a three-phase implementation:

"Chaos" (1st year)	"Clarification" (2nd year)	"Crystalization" (3rd year)
Mobilization	Implementation	Stabilization and Institutionalization

The first two phases, mobilization and implementation, require "active evaluation," since the need is for information about process. In the third phase or thereafter, GFE may be appropriate since by that time the program may have stabilized enough to provide useful information about outcome effect. If you look at outcomes earlier, you may get quite unreliable readings.

Now appropriate evaluation activities may be very different at macro/micro levels:

		Organizations
MACRO:	a) policy image	Congress
	b) program goals	Federal agencies
MICRO:	a) policy image	State/School District
	b) project goals	Local Schools

On the macro-level general policy and program directions are set. The micro level is concerned with the relation to local policy and with project implementation. Note that there are policy images at both levels. We usually think of the chain of effects somewhat as follows:



However there are many ways of implementing an image.

Marginal Glosses
by Karl Weick.

Recently I've developed an interest in the skill of writing marginal glosses because in one sense this is what application is about. I spent this morning making some "glosses" concerning the discussion. There's no intended organization here, just comments. But perhaps there'll be something to stimulate your thoughts.

1. The Triangle Hyphothesis. This idea comes from social psychology, where one is studying the interaction of two persons under conditions of competition or cooperation. The hypothesis can be depicted as in Figure 3.1.

FIGURE 3.1

THE TRIANGLE HYPOTHESIS



What this figure suggests is that if one person approaches the situation with the expectation that it will be a cooperative situation, there is a wide range of behaviors available to the other person, ranging from highly cooperative to highly competetive (suggested by the Xs along the side of the triangle. However, if either person approaches the situation with competitive expectations, the range of behavior is narrowly restricted (as suggested by the ⊗ at the bottom of the triangle). Is it possible that programmed and adaptive approaches also follow the triangle hypotheses? That is, do adaptive approaches provide the latitude for a range of approaches, while programmed approaches tend to restrict what we can do? Is it possible that programmed images only evoke programmed responses?

2. Discounting Incrementalism. Ian Lustick (1979) in a paper presented at the Midwest Political Science Association, discussed some ideas dealing with disjointed incrementalism and what may be wrong with it. He mentions four ways "muddling" gets you in trouble:

a. Where the system has variables of different orders of magnitude. For example in coal or oil burning sulphur pollution, incrementalism may be OK; but in radiation pollution the long term effects are not known. Don't mess with incrementalism.

b. Where the intensity and comprehensiveness of linkages in a system are high and far-reaching, incrementalism may get you in trouble. A change in a small water district's handling of sewage may be entirely local in its effects; but discharges into a large river may be dangerous far downstream.

c. Muddling is risky if there is no redundancy of resources, e.g., a rich family can afford to experiment with new foods and throw them away if they don't like them. A very poor family can't do that.

d. Incrementalism may be OK if power is fairly evenly distributed. But if power is unequal, the powerful tend to gain at the expense of the powerless. California's "muddling" with Proposition 13, actually gave the largest share of savings to commercial firms and to federal and state taxes, not to the homeowners. Schools, public services, and the poor lost power in that shuffle.

3. Emotions, Hopes, Motivations, Generosity. I urge you to read Deutch (1964, Chapter 13). In this chapter Deutch runs through a whole set of ideas associated with loose coupling that involve images of humility, acceptance, and faith. We are going to have to be a bit "square" when we consider ideological and emotional accompaniments of loose coupling. People need anchors that may be tied to needs and hopes, and taking things on faith. Loose coupling can operate where people trust in one another. John Meyer (1977) refers to the "logic of confidence." These ideas are really important in these new perspectives.

4. Warning vs. Giving Confidence. See the last chapter in Steinbrunner (1974). There you will find a vivid contrast of rational and non-rational approaches. Steinbrunner's point is that leaders are often fairly well informed about the risks of alternative options. The problem for a leader when confronted with hard choices, such as Kennedy during the Cuban missile

crisis, is that they need confidence to take some course of actions. Simply warning them about all the risks is unacceptable.

5. Misreading of Loose Coupling. I believe we all have a bias to see more order than is really there. Whether in research or in action arenas, there is a strong press to interpret, to make some sense of complex situations This is a problem for us, also a problem when we go to practitioners. Suppose someone is running an adaptive, loose system, but sees and describes it as a tight system. There is a danger of tightening the structure and destroying adaptability.

6. Integration of Loosely Coupled Systems. The reason loosely coupled systems tend to work is that there is, or was, tight coupling elsewhere. In the schools we may forget that there is a long prior history of professional socialization, selection of staff, and development of trust. When these are present, we can afford to give people discretion within their sphere of competence; then we can tolerate a degree of autonomy.

7. Tour! This last comment is an imperative. If I had only one recommendation for managers, I'd advise them to spend lots of time in their schools milling around in order to recognize and understand the flows and intersections of organizational activity. People make do with bits and pieces of information. In ambiguous situations, presence alone helps, but it is more. You pick up pieces of information that help you to label, to emphasize, to encourage desired behavior and activity.

[END OF TUESDAY, JULY 24th SESSION]

WEDNESDAY, JULY 25th SESSION

Karl Weick made a brief commentary on items in a bibliography that he had prepared for the workshop [see Bibliography].

P. HOOD: Yesterday, Ann Lieberman expressed a concern about looking at some real cases that involve inter-organization efforts aimed school improvement, in order to see how the ideas we've been discussing could be applied. I asked her if she would outline two "thumbnail" cases that we could consider. Ann's cases will focus on local level arrangements. Following Ann, I've asked Sue McKibbin to present two state agency cases that are the focus of her doctoral dissertation.

Two School Improvement Case Studies
Ann Lieberman, Teachers College, Columbia University

The League. I began teaching in 1964. In 1967 I started working on a project with John Goodlad. Goodlad was one of Ralph Tyler's students, and so he had a thorough grounding in educational goals and objectives. The project, now known as the League of Cooperating Schools, was funded by the Kettering Foundation. The League staff, of which I was a part, included two teachers and several principals. The goals were: a) to research the process of change; and b) to improve schools. The research function served to provide an "image" that would give us respectability with schools. However, we found out what we really were doing about two years into the project. This personal experience makes it easy for me to accept the idea that "action precedes goals."

The League consisted of 18 school districts, one school in each district. We visited each school two times a month, and the principals of the schools came together monthly. As we worked with the schools, I discovered that "people lie"--that's putting it harshly to make the point that there was a lot of posing and defensiveness. There was also a tremendous tension

between wanting a "bag of useful knowledge" and the discovery that there was no "bag." If we thought research had a lot to offer, all of us soon found that most research wasn't all that useful in solving the kinds of problems in these schools. There was also the tension of "tell me what to do," but "don't tell me." We all came to understand--researchers and practitioners alike that there was much knowledge none of us had.

Our goals were repeatedly transformed. One example was having to write job descriptions when we didn't understand our linking job. I especially recall Egon Guba coming out to make a presentation on "change." When it was over, the school people in effect said, if that's all you researchers know about changing schools, we had better start helping ourselves. From that point on, the project changed it's character. We became "facilitators" as opposed to "experts." It really became a cooperative effort.

The Metropolitan School Study Council. I am now the Associate Director at the Horace-Mann Lincoln Institute at Teachers College. Thirty years ago Paul Mort formed the Metropolitan School Study Council (MSSC). This is one of the oldest School Study Councils in America. Mort was interested in finance and his students did about 110 dissertations on educational change. The MSSC structure is still in place. There's a long sense of history. The Council has flourished when a professor has been able to arrange time to do field work and has floundered when run by a graduate student. The former symbolizes to the field that the college cares, the latter that the college is not serious. Two years ago I was asked to work with MSSC. It then had 11 districts and had some of the characteristics of an "old boys club." It now has 26 districts and has changed its character and function.

The challenge was how to change the structure and program of the Council. To some extent I've focused on Karl Weick's point about focusing on

ideology and symbols. I was able to get Teachers College to let us use an old mansion it owns. It's not only a beautiful old place, but it has ample parking. That's a tremendous plus in N.Y.C. I asked Seymour Sarason to come to talk to the group about resource sharing. This occasion provided the chance to ask every superintendent to bring one principal to the meeting. Seymour's ideas and the presence of the principals provided significant input of new ideas and interest. I got the Council to allow me to bring some graduate students, including many women to work with schools as linkers. Previously I was the only woman in the group. The principals, graduate students, and an occasional outside speaker have helped to refocus attention and interest. I am still studying ways to make more deliberate interventions both with the College and the school districts.

What became clear to me is that most people use the imagery of programming while they act adaptively. Programmed aspects help to get support politically and financially. But the real work is the adaptive stuff. For instance in the MSSC project, I realize that I was trying to recreate the League experience i.e., to get schools to share resources, to get a sense of sharing with project staff. Although I understand this general aim, it is hard to specify in any programmed way exactly what steps should be taken or in exactly what order. You try something and see if it works. You experiment and adjust as you go. However, to justify the project to Teachers College, I argued that students need field experience. I told students we'll offer your help to schools, to help schools in some way; but generally, we are trying to build a network. All these ideas are initially images to unite people.

The school members were given two general choices: just come to meetings, or they could also get a "linker." But the students didn't know what

to do. They were very uneasy because there was no "job description." They had to discover, find a role. The students have met periodicallly to discuss "what's our role" Some students were systematic; they pushed for role descriptions. Other students were willing to discover. It wasn't until the end of the first year that most people could describe the role of linkers. Now after two years of participation, people can understand what Sarason was saying. When he spoke of sharing resources, learning from each other, helping one another--the idea was merely symbolic, but it represented a superordinate goal larger than all of us.

Commentary

A. HUFF: Then the League was a template for your current Council work?

A. LIEBERMAN: Yes.

S. SCHAINKER: It seems to me that you had a goal.

A. LIEBERMAN: Yes, but I haven't pressed for specific objectives.

P. BERMAN: Most people act with purpose; people will respond with "purposeful descriptions."

D. CLARK: Anne's interpretation of the last case does not sound right. Using the imagery of a programmed approach while behaving adaptively sounds like a transition step until we can better explain adaptiveness. In a transition stage it is very difficult to explicate behavior as adaptive. Most people act purposively, but they may not be guided by one purpose. Goal-free evaluation and planning are attacks on the inevitability of what derives from a unitary sense of direction or purpose. Note that the newer perspectives view post facto rationalization as helpful and appropriate. It enables us to make sense out of what we did. And, as Paul Berman has indicated, there are situations where programming is efficient, and should be used.

P. BERMAN: I like Dave's entire point, not just the last part. We really haven't articulated adaptive strategies and tactics very well.

P. HOOD: There appears to be a problem for many people because programmed approaches appear to be highly disciplined and "scientific" while adaptive approaches seem to be undisciplined and "arty." I find it helpful to separate some concepts.

FIGURE 3.2

RELATION OF IMPLEMENTATION APPROACHES TO DISCIPLINED INQUIRY



In this figure the horizontal dimension is a continuum that is anchored at its ends by Paul Berman's two ideal types of approaches. The vertical continuum suggests that there may be varying degrees of disciplined inquiry (Cronbach and Suppes, 1969). Now, I suspect that when most people think of programmed approaches they think of cell # 1, and when they think of adaptive approaches they think of # 4. I see no reason to believe that adaptive approaches can not be disciplined (cell # 2); and certainly some programmed approaches are pretty messy, undisciplined, and noncumulative (cell #3).

A. LIEBERMAN: Both of the cases I presented were school-college arrangements. Jim Smith and Phil Daro have described a California school-department of education arrangement. I think the New Jersey Thorough and Efficient Program (T&E), provides an interesting contrast to the California School Improvement Program. Three or four years ago New Jersey legislated on old idea that all schools in the state should be thorough and effecient. The impetus for T&E came partly from a financial crunch and the need to redistribute educational funds more equitably, but this need got merged with the desire to hold schools more accountable. There are requirements for districts to collaborate with community representatives, to specify goals and objectives, and to get into program budgeting. New Jersey also has statewide competency testing. T&E lays out a planning process, with some alternatives. The main teeth in the program is that the state department of education can disapprove the district plan. There's some important fallout--including generation of an enormous amount of paperwork, and some new intermediate Educational Improvement Centers, which are supposed to provide technical assistance. Superintendents that can't respond adaptively to T&E are having great problems, but those who are adaptive are exploiting T&E as an opportunity to make changes in their district.

P. BERMAN: This may be a classic example of "mix" by level: heavy programming at the state level, and adaptive approach by at least some school districts at the local level. Milbrey and I (Berman and McLaughlin, 1978) wrote something for NIE about declining enrollments. Our conclusion was that although there were problems, there were also opportunities to be seized.

W. MASON: But we should note that in T&E, it's the process that has been programmed, not the educational program itself.

A. LIEBERMAN: Yes, and that is also true in California's School Improvement Program. But the effect in NJ is high conflict because the process is mandated for all districts. In California the program is voluntary.

[BREAK]

P. HOOD: As Ann noted, her cases focused on school level arrangements that involved assistance of college of education staff. In our last discussion, we've also referred to state programs, the NJ Thorough and Efficient and the California School Improvement. Sue McKibbin has worked in the Illinois State Department of Education for several years. She is now completing her doctoral dissertation at the University of Illinois. The dissertation subject is two case studies of how the state agency went about implementing state legislation.

Two Case Studies of Program Implementation in a State Education Agency
Sue McKibbin, College of Education, University of Illinois

Background. I worked with Lou Ponty at the Unversity of Illinois, which may explain why I began collecting data in an ethnographic style about what was going on around me at the Department of Education. It started just as a way to practice some of the methods. But as I got into it, I decided to do a comparative analysis of how the Department implemented two pieces of educational legislation.

Before discussing the cases, here's a brief background. In Illinois there are very strong "local control" norms. The State Superintendent was an elective position. Candidates who went along with these norms tended to get elected and to stay in office. So the Department went along with the Superintendent's wishes. Legislation was interpreted for LEA's in a way that was the minimum requirement needed to comply with the legislation.

Then Illinois got a college professor as a State Superintendent who wanted the Department to be more active, to take a more directive stance. The Department staff pushed through more rules and regulations. There was more Department programming than before. The LEAs reacted. A new state constitution changed the State Superintendent to an appointive office. The State Superintendent was replaced. The State Board of Education made an out of state search and brought in Joe Cronin. Cronin brought Nelson Ashline with him as Deputy Superintendent. Both men understood the politics of local control. The Department is going back to its old minimal requirements stance, but perhaps with some greater emphasis on providing assistance if requested.

In that changing Department environment, but also with financial belt tightening in the Department, and some greater local distrust of State Department "bureaucrats," I began to look at these two cases.

The Secular Textbook Loan Program. This case represents a situation where both the legislation and the Department's implementation of the law succeeded because most people thought it would fail. The law was initiated by legislators who wanted to do something for their large Catholic constituencies. Everyone, including the governor thought the law would be declared unconstitutional, so they passed the legislation and the governor signed it into law. (He did reduce the budget substantially from $15,000,000 to $10,000; but he didn't want the onus of vetoing it.) They all waited for the court test. However, no one looked carefully at how the bill was written, which was modeled on a Pennsylvania bill that had been declared constitutional. The point was that the state bought the textbooks and loaned them to students, not to schools.

In the excitement of the Department reorganization following the arrival of a new State Superintendent, and given general lack of interest in doing anything about a law that would be declared unconstitutional, there was a great lack of interest in the Department, but someone had to go through the motions. One fairly senior person, with twelve years in the Agency, was without a niche in the new organization. He was named as the coordinator of the textbook loan program. He did his homework and discovered the law was constitutional. Despite the fact that he was almost virtually isolated in the agency and without a staff, he began building a framework. He developed a detailed implementation plan, wrote a policy paper, organized an advisory council, built up the whole machinery. He sent paper up, but he got no response. However, in the Department, if you communicate to your superiors, and they don't react, you have tacit approval. So he went ahead.

Then at the next session of the legislature the program was funded at $3,500,000. Suddenly the program was constitutional, organized, and well-funded. Moreover, the State Board got interested because some members were influenced by their Catholic constituency.

Up to that time the coordinator had very deliberately planned the program to conform to existing procedures--forms, the management information system requirements, SOPs, clearance with outside agencies had all been done in a routine way. He aimed for the least modification of existing routines. Because the program had been seen as a hopeless case and no exceptions were involved, everyone had signed off. When the money came, people were threatened. The coordinator met with everyone who had any interest, answered questions, and explained he didn't intend to take over anyone's turf.

Two years after the program was started, an effort was made to repeal the legislation; it failed. The budget has been raised to five million and

then to nine million dollars. Maybe the moral to this story is be covertly strong, but overtly weak.

Minimal Competency Testing. My counterpoint case is one that has had very high visibility and great difficulties in implementation. The Deputy Superintendent runs this program. He and the State Superintendent realized that some kind of minimal competency program would be inevitable in Illinois. They were concerned with how to deal with political and public pressure in the best way for education. They began to look at issues. They decided to try to avoid having a state run minimal competency test. So they constrained the area in which issues were negotiated. They aimed for a State Board resolution favoring competency testing and accountability, but stating that the choice of methods should be left to local schools. The argument was that more data is needed before the state does any more, i.e., let the locals work it out; it's too early for the Department to do more. Then the staff and Deputy used the resolution, to make their case with the legislature.

At the same time professional education organizations were gavanized by the previous year's discussion in the legislature. They were ready when the issue came up again in the legislature, and their stand was coordinated with the Department's position.

Up to this point everything seems to be neat, tidy, programmed. The Department got its "let the locals do it" legislation. But since then the implementation fell apart. The program never got organized.

Comments

P. BERMAN: Maybe the policy was to have it fail. Programmed adoption is often symbolic... I'm more interested in your first case since it raises the issue of when there should be low/high visibility in implementation. I'm intrigued with the contingency implications.

D. CLARK: Both of these cases are interesting. But I'm not sure what they say to us about either new perspectives or school improvement. The first case is so unusual, it's extreme. Apparently the coordinator knew all the programming rules and gambits, and was thoroughly familiar with the agency's planning and approval requirements. I find it interesting that when the coordinator discovered the law would probably be constitutional, that particular, highly significant piece of information was not communicated to any superordinates in the agency. This was low profile almost to the point of being surreptitious. Conflict was avoided because the "problem" was of no apparent concern to any one. Perhaps if we strain to use the garbage can model to interpret those events, decisions were made by "oversight," e.g., others were too busy attending to interesting choice situations, and they just signed off. I do see that the textbook loan program coordinator seemed to be following several tactics described by Karl Weick (1976): namely: spend time, persist, exchange status for substance, and manage unobtrusively.

I'm not sure that Sue had enough time to describe the second case adequately, but I disagree with her conclusion. The State Superintendent is just too smart to let an important program be screwed up. Perhaps Paul's point about symbolic adoption is the main point for the Department's program implementation effort, but you didn't give us much information about that. The legislative phase just seems to be a success story about deflecting political pressure and buying time. Since the "bloom" is already fading for competency testing in some states, going through motions symbolically at the legislative and administrative levels may buy enough time for Illinois to take a hard look at experience in other parts of the country.

Designing Next Steps

P. HOOD: Our time in this workshop is now very short. In this last session, I invite you to consider future directions. EDSSP has some modest resources to do some follow-up work this year, and we've proposed some general plans to NIE for some kind of continuation next year. We've invited the FWL Regional Program to cosponsor this workshop. Lynn Jenks and Stanley Schainker are interested in whether we can move far enough to develop tools or workshop materials that would be of value to practitioners in the FWL region. What are your ideas about what should be done next? Because David Clark will be helping us plan the follow-up, I'm asking him to chair this session.

P. BERMAN: On the first day I was impressed by the similarities. On the second day differences in ideas or different areas of application began to emerge. Today, I've been upset in thinking about next steps if we are talking about something useful to practitioners.

As long as we are vague, we have consensus, but when we get specific there is disagreement; that says something about the concepts.

So maybe there are two questions: 1) Can the concepts be applied? 2) Ought they to be applied? Discussion of incomplete ideas may be dangerous. We need to assess where these concepts are. Do these concepts have a solid enough knowledge base to be applied? Is there something prior to figuring out how to apply the concepts?

D. CLARK: I recall Mike's comment to the effect that "if nothing else, there ought to be some dissemination."

P. BERMAN: It would be valuable to have: a) a synthesis; b) a critique and analysis that would clarify distinctions among ideas; and c) some form of dissemination.

D. CLARK: There are several ways to go about that. For example, we could use the existing literature and develop an anthology; ask people to put their materials together, maintain the identification of authors, and perhaps provide some commentary.

P. BERMAN: The benefit for me of these three days will come as a delayed reaction. It will take time to play itself out. I would personally opt for something that gave the flavor of more interchanges.

D. CLARK: We can try to capture for ourselves what was the significance of this workshop, but it may not be easy to share with others that weren't here.

W. MASON: Suppose we paired off, and had say, Karl Weick comment on Paul Berman.

K. WEICK: Here's another idea. What if we took a case study and "glossed" the case in several columns, each of us adding our own commentary. It would need to be a rich case. Then we could invite other people to gloss.

S. McKIBBIN: That sounds interesting. There's no one way to analyze a case.

P. BERMAN: I think there can be dysfunctions. I recall Graham Allison's case study of the Cuban missile crisis. In that study he looked at the same situation three ways: rational, political, bureaucratic. My problem is that the approach often represents a cop-out because people don't follow through to see if the analysis has methodological validity. Too often there's only superficial treatments.

W. MASON: But is this relevant here?

D. CLARK: Karl suggested adding a fourth or fifth view. Illustrating concepts may be different from developing a complete, valid analysis.

L. JENKS: How much is needed before an idea is apparent?

P. BERMAN: We are talking about different theories--

W. MASON: --or just illustrating conceptual fragments?

D. CLARK: But I was considering the glosses as commentaries, not elaborations.

K. WEICK: Maybe one commentator doesn't have anything to say for some time, while another comments on the first paragraph of the case. That says something.

D. CLARK: Perhaps the least ambitious effort would be to do an article. It's more ambitious to provide a richly annotated bibliography. It would be even more work to select a small set of key ideas and take four or five pages each to describe and discuss the concept, e.g., "coupledness." It would be even more work to discuss specific applications in education, but it might be a little easier to simply note the citations that give educational examples.

You could imagine a more extensive monograph--a "primer" on new perspectives. Its aim would be to help someone broaden their repertoire of analytical techniques and perspectives. I've just been reading Environments and Organizations (Meyer, 1978). It's simply a collection of papers. It's clumsy.

K. WEICK: Heavy reading.

D. CLARK: Karl, does anything like a "primer" exist?

K. WEICK: Is this a collection or an explication?

D. CLARK: Both, I'm not sure how many different sections it might have, e.g., a section on concepts, another on cases, perhaps another on instruments and methods.

K. WEICK: I haven't seen anything like that.

P. HOOD: Probably the easiest approach would be to search for articles, and then generate commentary.

K. WEICK: How about less traditonal, non-print approaches?

D. CLARK: It's possible, but I don't see how non-print approaches would engage a broader circle, at least at this stage. Still there is the question of how to go beyond journal articles as vehicles to reach researchers.

P. HOOD: I recently read a memoriam on Linquist. It made the point that Linquist wrote very few journal articles on statistics, but he wrote several highly influential textbooks that made novel, significant contributions to educational and psychological statistics practice. Linquist saw journal articles as not being very cumulative in their effect. He put his effort into organizing his ideas and developing them in a form that would be conveniently accessible to students.

D. CLARK: People are left "at sea" with one or two articles, if that's all they've read in a new area. However, I'm thinking of 40 or 50 people as being "wide diffusion," at least in early stages.

K. WEICK: But you aren't thinking of something like Dunnette's (1976) Handbook? That's 1,700 pages.

D. CLARK: NO!

P. HOOD: Back to Karl's question, how about the less print prone?

P. BERMAN: Work like this has to be for small numbers. You could try for a small panel at AERA. It could be audio or videotaped.

D. CLARK: Paul Hood's trying to get us to look at a broader practitioner audience.

S. McKIBBIN: I've used workshops in which we presented 1-1/2 page vignettes of school problem situations to stimulate small group discussions to analyze problems and suggest solutions. We've used the same problem sometimes, but have changed the contextual factors. Could we do something like this in print? Could we let the reader think of commentary, and then provide expert's commentary?

P. HOOD: Suppose the California State Department of Education wanted to do something with the FWL Regional Program. If the audience were school principals, I'm worried that we aren't ready yet.

L. JENKS: For that application you need description and rich, relevant illustration rather than prescription.

K. WEICK: I'd do that face-to-face. In the a.m. I'd get together a handful of people and discuss real problems in detail. In the p.m. I'd discuss these problems from the point of view of the new perspectives, and at the end of the day I'd leave time to ask if this helps. It's low risk, tuned to their situation, and reality-oriented.

S. SCHAINKER: I like that! There should be the a.m. session, OK, and the p.m. too. But then you need to take another step; collaboratively, to ask "if this is true, or helpful, what are the implications?"

P. BERMAN: I like that. These ideas are ready for practitioners, if we use their language.

C. CATES: I agree. Start where they are. Part of our problem is that we don't know quite where they are, how to present ideas, what kinds of examples will be most effective.

W. MASON: Is that the primary purpose, to test the value?

D. CLARK: It's quite clear to me that there may be some hostility. Stanley (Schainker), you know there will be hostility. These practitioners have been schooled in rationalistic approaches.

P. HOOD: It seems to be a good way to learn!

K. WEICK: But it may be dangerous.

D. CLARK: To change the subject for a moment, perhaps we should create a more durable panel that would meet several times over, say a year. Maybe, we could take a couple of perspectives and develop treatments in depth, and then provide briefer treatments of perhaps a dozen more topics. Perhaps, we could aim for some kind of publication with joint authorship.

L. JENKS: It seems that some of the perspectives have a double life: 1) in Karl Weick's head; and 2) in others' heads in what they recognize in their own situation.

P. BERMAN: My favorite people are local school district assistant superintendents. I think they are very good candidates for some of these ideas. I worry that here at the Laboratory it's a different problem. I'm not saying the micro-level (local schools) is the only level to aim at, but that's the fundamental level. I'll admit it may not be the safest place to begin.

L. JENKS: Here's a possibility. The FWL Regional Program is just beginning. Here in California one of our tasks is to conduct, with the teachers centers, four or five colleges, two university extensions, and the county offices, a kind of "TTT" process for supporting the dissemination of a reading program planning handbook to schools throughout the State. There's a potential for a lot of interagency interaction. There's planning problems, management problems, and evaluation problems. Would you want to use this activity as a field experiment in applying these concepts?

A. HUFF: I wouldn't be interested in finding that schools are loosely coupled, but I would be interested in the implications of loose coupling for school improvement.

D. CLARK: Much of our evidence is based on studies in institutions of higher education. I'm not sure that the documentation on situations in elementary and secondary schools is that rich.

P. BERMAN: Developing a research agenda is relatively easy. But, I had assumed, until this moment, that this was not being entertained--that our concern was with the application of the ideas in interorganizational school improvement efforts.

K. WEICK: But it could be helpful to take a critical look at the research. Awhile back I worked on an NIH panel that looked at "risky shift" research. It really helped to organizae and make some sense out of all that had been done on that subject.

D. CLARK: We could try to identify what is and is <u>not</u> going on in research in this area. There could be some exchange of information (the working panel idea), some identification of less well-known activity and, perhaps, some stimulation of research; especially research in educational settings.

P. BERMAN: This shifts the focus away from products to process. Maybe we should look at "process" rather than "the agenda."

D. CLARK: OK, if you wanted to get the ideas into the parlance of practitioners, I'd start by targeting interesting articles to broadly read practitioner journals (e.g., PDK), and to making presentations at practitioner conventions (e.g., AASA).

That's a dissemination "spread" approach. For more intensive dissemination, aimed at implementation, there is the possibility of working with eight or ten school districts that would be interested in developing their own case

studies. We could sponsor an "agent" only to help them plan and develop the case descriptions.

P. BERMAN: I have a problem. I don't want to turn practitioners into being researchers.

D. CLARK: I'm only asking them to document, and then try to use their descriptions as a way of "testing." for example, Mike Scriven doesn't have to prove to me he can use GFE, but I'd like to see how others do it.

P. BERMAN: School people will easily pick up on cues, so I trust hardly anything that's written in schools. Testing ideas is OK, but I wish we could document it as an ethnographer would; that is, without contamination.

D. CLARK: Out time is just about out. Let's run a round robin on final ideas or suggestions. Carolyn?

C. CATES: I have no additions. I would like to make the point that we don't have to select only one idea to work on.

W. MASON: No comment.

K. WEICK: Regarding listening to people talk and then reacting, I'm intrigued with a "bug in the ear" technique that has been used to train family therapists. My fantasy would be listening to Stan (Schainker) being rational, with Karl Weick in another room cueing him through the bug that there was an alternative to rationality. I would like a back and forth process, whether marginal glossing of a manuscript, listening and then providing feedback, or a "bug in the ear," or something intimate.

L. JENKS: Let's try to find test situations.

S. SCHAINKER: I'm sitting here resisting asking what we are trying to accomplish.

P. BERMAN: I want to see more workshops. This one has far exceeded my expectations, despite it not doing some things I wanted. I want to interact more with practitioners, even like the cases this morning. But it is also important to interact with people who are thinking about these ideas, as well as practitioners. I found out a lot about my own ideas as I began to confront other perspectives and the real people promoting them. This is a rare opportunity to collaborate. Maybe the development of another workshop interests me most.

K. WEICK: Yes, and there is also going to be so much individual working through after we leave the workshop.

A. HUFF: I want to reinforce ideas of more interactions, e.g., workshops. And it is important to build in tensions and to confront other positions, for example, "glossing" each other's draft papers. When we compared reactions to the two case studies today, which did not all agree, I learned new things.

K. WEICK: Perhaps the closest we came to a constructive confrontation was when David Clark suggested an alternative to Sue McKibbin's case interpretation.

P. HOOD: My sense is that we are still in an exploratory stage. I'd like to encourage activities that stimulate divergent thinking and discovery.

D. CLARK: I think we could do some work on clustering the "families" of concepts and approaches. Could we build a crude taxonomy of new perspectives?

P. HOOD: We've run out of time. I want to thank all of you for coming and contributing so much to this workshop. Although we've not been recording these sessions some of us have been taking notes. It may take a few weeks, but I promise that I'll send you a copy of our informal record of the workshop proceedings. And we'll keep you informed about our follow-up plans. Thank you again for so many stimulating ideas.

SECTION III

POSTSCRIPT

By

David L. Clark, School of Education, Indiana University

This workshop report hardly requires a summary and no effort was made to generate consensus by the participants. It did seem useful, however, as an epilogue, to reflect briefly upon and to highlight some of the key concepts discussed during a provocative three day exchange of ideas. The selective reflection on the "key concepts" is the author's responsibility--the ideas are chiefly borrowed or stolen from others.

I'm O.K.--You're O.K. The newer organizational perspectives may be explicated by organizational theorists but they are grounded in the experience of practitioners. The theoretical assertions of ambiguity, trial and error, and just plain muddling through in organizations legitimizes the everyday life of organizational participants. Organized anarchies do perform redundant and overlapping activities to attain their ends. Their goals are often unclear; usually not shared, or even understood, by most employees. And yet, these are the organizations which successfully carry out the vital work of our society. The oddly human characteristics manifested by these organizations frequently support optimum levels of effectiveness if not efficiency. If the newer perspectives serve no other purpose, they may help people accept the fact that there will be ambiguity and anarchy in organizational systems; that they are not necessarily failing or in need of reorganization or restaffing simply because their institution manifests non-systematic responses.

Avoiding a New Orthodoxy. There is no one perspective from which to view the organizational world. Rational systems models of organizations provide a vantage point from which some activities of some organizations can be understood some of the time. The same claim can be registered for such concepts as loosely coupled units, adaptive implementation, goal-free evaluation or planning. But there are three points worth consideration in relation to the new perspectives which are not as accommodating to the classical perspectives:

- The new perspectives explain more of what occurs in more organizations more of the time. They are more heuristic conceptual schemes.
- The balance in organizational research and organizational technology needs to be redressed from a heavy overemphasis on rational models which have had limited utility, e.g., PPBS, MBO, zero-based budgeting, etc.
- Advocates of the new perspectives do argue that: 1) classical perspectives have created negative consequences for organizations which attempted to employ their overly rational and sequential constructs; and 2) familiarity with the new perspectives will arm contemporary administrators and researchers with a broader repertoire of responses to individual and group behavior in organizations.

Coupledness--Loose and Tight. The broad concept of "coupledness" or connectedness may go a long way toward distinguishing between the more classical and contemporary organizational perspectives. The concept is only partially reflected in the notion of loosely coupled units. The new perspectives assert that the disconnections frequently involve:

1. Organizational units--the health of one unit not being dependent on the success of others.
2. Individuals in organizations--often in competition or entirely out of contact with one another even when their work and interests apparently intersect.
3. Processes and products--the disconnection of planning, activities, outputs; or problems, solutions, and decision makers; or goals, objectives, decisions, and actions

This phenomenon of loose coupling or disconnectedness explains why the new perspectives are conceptually at odds with their predecessors. Formal organizational theorists have long recognized the distinction between formal and informal views of an institution. Surely, they noted, individuals in organizations modified the formal structure in daily operation. But the new perspectives go much further. They point out that the reconstructed logics of the formal organization theorists are not simply distinct from logics-in-use within those organizations but basically inappropriate views of most organizations, much of the time, i.e., the reconstructed logics themselves need to be reconsidered. Actions which precede goals, disconnected units, problems which are diffused rather than solved, organizations with legitimate preference for procedures rather than results are not simply instances of adjustments to the formal, rational organizational structure. They call for new ways of viewing what happens to and in many organizations much of the time.

Validation by Conceptual Multi-angulation. The participants in this workshop surprised one another by reinforcing their views of organizations starting from quite different perspectives. Obviously they were chosen because of their interest in new perspectives but not because of their interest in similar perspectives. The presenters and reactors, however, shared, as Cates noted, "...a strong notion of tenuous relationships, looseness, inconsistencies, and unpredictability of relations--between agency levels; between the administrative and the technical core; between goals, actions, and results."

School Improvement Programs: Prototypic Anarchies. A number of organizational observers have noted that educational institutions conform especially well to the characteristics employed to describe organized anarchies,

i.e., problematic preferences, unclear technology, fluid participation. If these organizations individually can be so characterized, interorganizational groupings of these agencies for school improvement purposes exhibit, as Hood noted, configurations in which 1) the stakes at issue are relatively unimportant to the stake holders and 2) authority and responsibility are ill-defined or broadly distributed. Note as examples of such relationships school study councils, leagues of schools, the participating agencies of the National Diffusion Network, etc. There are almost no instances of such relationships in which the interorganizational arrangement is not voluntary, ad hoc, fluctuating in membership and program. If the newer perspectives can speak to any group of managers and designers, they can surely speak to those involved in educational knowledge utilization efforts.

Call Me an Experimenter. Racists and sexists are not the only repositories of pejorative linguistic designations. Leaders who are uncertain; organizations which are rudderless; units which are muddling through can be viewed on the one hand as individuals and organizations which are failing or, on the other, as individuals in organizations who understand the real situation. Mixing, matching, and switching tactics adaptively in the process of implementation has quite a different ring than muddling through or drifting with the tide. On the assumption that the real world of organization life is less certain than many reconstructed logics have portrayed it to be, we need to assume that tentative probes by administrators may be systematic explorations of the future and dignify these efforts with positive or at least neutral descriptions.

A Technology of Foolishness. If there is one thing missing almost altogether in the new perspectives it is March's call for a "technology of foolishness." For the practicing administrator, the new perspectives are

consoling and simultaneously unsatisfying. They describe accurately situations the administrator recognizes in the daily life of the organization but then offer no practical technology to work with these situations. While the rationalist dusts off a workbook on management by objectives, the arationalist points out that MBO probably won't work. That is a trade-off that administrators, planners, and designers can hardly be expected to embrace. The new perspectives need to be supported by a much increased level of empirical inquiry but, even more, they need to be backed up with applications and technology which support organizational personnel who wish to work effectively within the real world of their organizations.

The Politics and Psychology of Rationalism. The classical views of organizations and how they function are supported by political and psychological tendencies so strong that advocates of arational perspectives will have to couch their observations in "acceptable" alternative terms, e.g.:

- Who wishes to point out to legislators or boards of trustees the redundancy and waste which cannot be eliminated in an interorganizational arrangement; and then defend it as not only inevitable but probably desirable in attaining effective operations?

- Would you prefer to be the first to report that based on our current activities we have discovered an appropriate set of post facto goals for the organization?

- Or that the new school improvement program to be supported in Congress is based on uncertain technology; likely to result, at best, in some incremental change; certain to be wasteful in execution; better to be designed to emphasize flexibility (a bit of playfulness) than orderliness; structured to make some failures safe rather than being fail-safe?

A rational view of organizations fosters political virtues and psychological health. In that rational world you are in control of your own destiny; accountable and responsive; orderly and efficient; systematic and

forceful. The tolerance for ambiguity can be narrow. Grandiose schemes and promises are within your grasp. Long range planning is feasible. Fail-safe protection is possible.

Of course, the evidence is overwhelming that such a world does not exist for most of us, most of the time. But it is truly foolish to assume that the new perspectives will be embraced enthusiastically in the real world simply because they are grounded in that world. Much of the language and action of practice is designed to soften and obfuscate the harsh realities of everyday life in organizations. Those who feel that the new perspectives will lead eventually to stronger more effective organizations will first have to cope with the powerful hold exercised over practitioners, policy and decision makers by rational, systems-based organizational models.

REFERENCES

Berman, P. "Thinking About Implementation Design: Matching Strategies to Situations." In Mann, D. and Ingram, N. (eds.). Why Policies Succeed and Fail. In preparation.

Berman, P. Designing Implementation to Match Policy Situations: A Contingency Analysis of Programmed and Adaptive Implementation. Santa Monica, CA: The Rand Corporation, 1978.

Berman, P. and McLaughlin, M. "The Management of Decline: Problems, Opportunities, and Research Questions." In Abramowitz, A. and Rosenfeld, S. (eds.). Declining Enrollments: The Challenge of the Coming Decade. Washington, DC: The National Institute of Education, 1978.

Bidwell, C. "The School as a Formal Organization." In March, J. (ed.). Handbook of Organizations. New York, NY: Rand McNally, 1965, 972-1022.

Clark, D. L. National Planning for Educational Dissemination and Utilization: A Search for Effective Alternatives. San Francisco, CA: Far West Laboratory for Educational Research and Development, 1977.

Clark, D. L. and Guba, E. G. The Configurational Perspective: A View of Educational Knowledge Production and Utilization. Washington, DC: Council for Educational Research and Development, 1974.

Cohen, M. D., March, J. G. and Olsen, J. P. "A Garbage Can Model of Organizational Choice." Administrative Science Quarterly, 17, 1-25, March 1972.

Cronbach, L. J. and Suppes, P. Research for Tomorrow's Schools: Disciplined Inquiry for Education. New York, NY: MacMillan, 1969.

Cyert, R. M. and March, J. G. A Behavioral Theory of the Firm. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1963.

CSDE. Planning Handbook. Sacramento, CA: California State Department of Education, 1978.

Daft, R. L. and Becker, S. W. The Innovative Organization: Innovation Adoption in School Organizations. New York, NY: Elsevier, 1978.

Deutch, K. The Nerves of Government. New York, NY: Free Press, 1963.

Dreeken, R. The Nature of Teaching. Glenview, IL: Scott-Foresman, 1970.

Dunnette, M. D. Handbook of Industrial and Organizational Psychology. Chicago, IL: Rand McNally College Publishing Co., 1976.

Freeman, J. "Going to the Well: School District Administrative Intensity and Environmental Constraint." Administrative Science Quarterly, 24, 119-133.

Lustick, I. "Discounting Disjointed Incrementalism: A Non-Epistemic Approach." Paper presented at Midwest Political Science Assoc., Dartmouth College, April, 1979.

March, J.G. and Olsen, J.P. "Model Bias in Social Action." Review of Educational Research, 42, 413-429, Fall 1972.

March, J.G. and Olsen, J.P. Ambiguity and Choice in Organizations. Bergen, Norway: Universitetsforlaget, 1976.

Meyer, J.W. and Rowan, B. "Institutionalized Organizations: Formal Structure as Myth and Ceremony." American Journal of Sociology, 83, 340-363, 1977.

Meyer, J.W., Scott, W.R., Cole, S., and Intile, J.K. Instructional Dissensus and Institutional Consensus in Schools. In Marshall W. Meyer (ed.), Environments and Organizations. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass, 1978, pp. 233-263.

Meyer, M.W. (ed.). Environments and Organizations. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass, 1978.

Scriven, M.--interviewed by Susan Salasin. Exploring Goal-Free Evaluation. Evaluation, 2, Nr. 1, 1974.

Scriven, M. Prose and Cons About Goal-Free Evaluation. Evaluation Comment, December 1976.

Sproull, L., Weiner, O. and Wolf, O. Organizing An Anarchy: Belief, Bureaucracy, and Politics in the National Institute of Education. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1978.

Steinbrunner, J.D. The Cybernetic Theory of Decision. Princeton, NJ: Princeton, 1974.

Thorngate, W. Possible Limits on a Science of Social Behavior. Edmonton, Alberta: Department of Psychology, January, 1975.

Weick, K.E. Educational Organizations as Loosely Coupled Systems. Administrative Science Quarterly, 21, 1-19, 1976.

AN ASSORTMENT OF REFERENCES SUGGESTIVE OF ALTERNATIVE WAYS TO THINK ABOUT ORGANIZATIONS

Karl E. Weick

Cornell University

(July 23, 1979)

Aldrich, H. Centralization Versus Decentralization in the Design of Human Service Delivery Systems: A Response to Gouldner's Lament. In Sarri, R.C. and Hansenfeld, Y. (eds.), The Management of Human Services. New York, NY: Columbia University, 1978. pp. 51-79.

Benson, J.K. Innovation and Crisis in Organizational Analysis. Sociological Inquiry, Winter 1977, 18, pp. 3-16.

Benson, J.K. Organizational Analysis: Critique and Innovation. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1977.

Berger, P.L., Berger, B., and Kellner, H. The Homeless Mind. New York, NY: Vintage, 1973.

Bernard, H.R. and Killworth, P.D. On the Social Structure of an Ocean-going Research Vessel and Other Important Things. Social Science Research, 1973, 2, pp. 145-184.

Bidwell, C.E. "The School as a Formal Organization." In March, J.G. (ed.), Handbook of Organizations. Chicago, IL: Rand, 1965. pp. 972-1022.

Brickman, P. "Is it Real?" In Harvey, J.H., Ickes, W., and Kidd, R.F. (eds.), New Directions in Attribution Research. Vol. 2, Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum, 1978. pp. 5-34.

Brown, R.H. Bureaucracy as Proxis: Toward a Political Phenomenology of Formal Organizations. Administrative Science Quarterly, 1978, 23, pp. 365-382.

Campbell, D.T. Systematic Error on the Part of Human Links in Communication Systems. Information and Control, 1958, 1, (4), pp. 334-369.

Chein, I. Some Sources of Divisiveness Among Psychologists. American Psychologist, 1966, 21, pp. 333-342.

Cohen, M.D., March, J.G., and Olsen, J.P. A Garbage Can Model of Organizational Choice. Administrative Science Quarterly, 1972, 17, pp. 1-25.

Cohen, M.D. and March, J.G. Leadership and Ambiguity. New York, NY: McGraw-Hill, 1974.

Daft, R.L. and Macintosh, N.B. Toward a Technology Model of Information Processing. Unpublished manuscript, Queen's University, 1979.

Daft, R.L. and Wiginton, J.C. Language and Organization. The Academy of Management Review, 1979, 4, pp. 179-192.

Deutsch, K. "The Self-Closure of Political Systems." (Chapter 13) In Deutsch, K. The Nerves of Government. New York, NY: Free Press, 1963.

Fernandez, J.W. Symbolic Consensus in a Fang Reformative Cult. American Anthropologist, 1965, 67, pp. 902-929.

Ford, J. Paradigms and Fairy Tales. Volumes 1-2. London, England: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1975.

Frost, P.J. and Hayes, D.C. Having One's Cake and Eating it Too: Middle Range Content and Generalized Process as Ways of Understanding Organization. Unpublished manuscript, University of British Columbia, 1978.

Gergen, K.J. Toward Generative Theory. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1978, 36, pp. 1344-1360.

Glassman, R.B. Persistence and Loose Coupling in Living Systems. Behavioral Science, 1973, 18, pp. 83-98.

Goldthorpe, J.H. A Revolution in Sociology? Sociology, 1973, 6&7, pp. 449-462.

Gould, S.J. A Threat to Darwinism. Natural History, 1975, 84, (December), 4, 9.

Granovetter, M.S. The Strength of Weak Ties. American Journal of Sociology, 1973, 78 (6), pp. 1360-1380.

Greenfield, M. Thinking Small. Newsweek, April 24, 1978, p. 112.

Hall, P.M. and Spencer-Hall, D.A. The Negotiated Order and the Definition of Problems in a School System. Unpublished manuscript, University of Missouri-Columbia, 1979.

Hall, R.I. An Integrated Model of Periodic Organizational Decision Making. Unpublished manuscript, University of Manitoba, 1977.

Hedberg, B.L.T., Nystrom, P.C., and Starbuck, W.H. Designing Organizations to Match Tomorrow. TIMS Studies in Management Sciences, 1977, 5, pp. 171-181.

Holling, C.S. "Resilience and Stability of Ecosystems." In Jantsch, E. and Waddington, C.H. (eds.), Evolution and Consciousness. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1976. pp. 73-92.

Jackson, P.W. Lonely at the Top: Observations on the Genesis of Administrative Isolation. School Review, May 1977. pp. 425-432.

Jacob, F. Evolution and Tinkering. Science, 1977, 196, pp. 1161-1166.

Kahn, F.E. The Tyranny of Small Decision: Market Failures, Imperfections, and the Limits of Economics. Kyklos, 1966, 19, pp. 23-47.

Katz, F.E. Autonomy and Organization. New York, NY: Random House, 1968.

Katz, F.E. Indeterminacy in the Structure of Systems. Behavioral Science, 1974, 19, pp. 394-403.

Klein, B. Dynamic Economics. Cambridge, MA: Harvard, 1977. (Appendix: Two Types of Rationality).

Langer, E.J. "Rethinking the Role of Thought in Social Interaction." In Harvey, J.H., Ickles, W., and Kidd, R.F. (eds.). New Directions in Attribution Research. Volume 2, Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum, 1978. pp. 35-58.

Long, N.E. The Local Community as an Ecology of Games. American Journal of Sociology, 1956, 64, pp. 251-261.

Lustick, L. Discounting Disjointed Incrementalism: A Non-Epistemic Approach. Paper presented at Midwest Political Science Association, April, 1979. (Dartmouth College).

Maines, D.R. Social Organization and Social Structure in Symbolic Interactionist Thought. Annual Review of Sociology, 1977, 3, pp. 235-259.

Mangham, I. Interactions and Interventions in Organizations. New York, NY: Wiley, 1978.

Manning, P.K. Semiotics and Loosely Coupled Organizations. Unpublished manuscript, Michigan State University, 1979.

March, J.G. Model Bias in Social Action. Review of Educational Research, 1972, 42, pp. 413-429.

Maruyama, M. Paradigms and Communication. Technological Forecasting and Social Change, 1974, 6, pp. 3-32.

McCaskey, M.B. Managing Ambiguity in the Case of a High Technology Research Project. Unpublished manuscript, Harvard University, May 5, 1978.

Meehl, P.E. Second-Order Relevance. American Psychologist, 1972, 27, pp. 932-940.

Meyer, J.W. and Rowan, B. Institutionalized Organizations: Formal Structure as Myth and Ceremony. American Journal of Sociology, 1977, 83, pp. 340-363.

Nelson, S.D. A General Systems Perspective on Governmental Use of Social Science Knowledge. Proceedings of 21st Annual North American Meeting, Society for General Systems Research, 1977.

Pennock, J.R. and Chapman, J.W. Anarchism. New York, NY: New York University, 1978.

Peters, T.J. Symbols, Patterns, and Settings: An Optimistic Case for Getting Things Done. Organizational Dynamics, Autumn 1978, pp. 3-23.

Phillips, K. The Balkanization of America. Harpers, May 1978, p. 256, (1536), pp. 37-47.

Pondy, L.R. "The Other Hand Clapping: An Information Processing Approach to Organizational Power." In Hammer, T.H. and Bacharach, S.B. (eds.), Reward Systems and Power Distribution. Ithaca, NY: NYSSILR, Cornell University, 1977. pp. 56-91.

Rainey, H.G., Backoff, R.W., and Levine, C.H. Comparing Public and Private Organizations. Public Administration Review, March/April, 1976, pp. 233-244.

Rumelt, R.P. Strategic Fit and the Organization-Environment Debate. Unpublished manuscript, UCLA, 1979.

Salancik, G.R. Notes on Loose-Coupling: Linking Intentions to Actions. Unpublished manuscript, University of Illinois, 1975.

Salancik, G.R. Commitment is too Easy. Organizational Dynamics, Summer 1977, pp. 62-80.

Sampson, E.E. Psychology and the American Ideal. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1977, 35, (11), pp. 767-782.

Sapolsky, H.M. The Polaris System Development. Cambridge, MA: Harvard, 1972.

Sarason, S.B. The Nature of Problem Solving in Social Action. American Psychologist, 1978, 33, pp. 370-380.

Schelling, T.C. Micromotives and Macrobehavior. New York, NY: Norton, 1978.

Schneider, L. The Role of the Category of Ignorance in Sociological Theory: An Exploratory Statement. American Sociological Review, 1962, 27, pp. 492-508.

Silverman, D. Reading Castenada. London: Routhledge and Kegan Paul, 1975.

Siu, R.G.H. Management and the Art of Chinese Baseball. Sloan Management Review, Spring 1978, pp. 83-89.

Steinbrunner, J.D. The Cybernetic Theory of Decision. Princeton, NJ: Princeton, 1974.

Tuckman, G. Making News: A Study in the Construction of Reality. New York, NY: Free Press, 1978.

Van Maanen, J. People Processing: Major Strategies of Organizational Socialization and Their Consequences. In Papp, J. (ed.), New Directions in Managing Human Resources. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, In press.

Weick, K.E. Educational Organization as Loosely Coupled Systems. Administrative Science Quarterly, 1976, 21, pp. 1-19.

Weick, K.E. Organization Design: Organizations as Self-Designing Systems. Organizational Dynamics, 1977, 6 (2), pp. 30-46.

Weick, K.E. "Spines of Leaders." In McCall, M. and Lombard M. (eds.), Leadership: Where Else Can We Go? Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1978. pp. 37-61.

Weiner, S.S. "Participation, Deadlines, and Choice." In March, J.G. and Olsen, J.P. Ambiguity and Choice in Organizations. Bergen: Universitetsforlaget, 1976. pp. 225-250.

Wilson, L. American Academics: Then and Now. New York, NY: Oxford, 1979.

Zurchev, L.A. The Mutual Self: A Self-Concept for Social Change. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1977.